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Abstract
My doctoral research focuses on analyzing how credit policies and regulations
affect the credit access of constrained firms. The first chapter focuses on the effec-
tiveness of a national-level directed credit program in India. I exploit a policy-induced
variation in program eligibility to study the differential impact of the program across
the firm-size distribution. In the second chapter, I evaluate the impact of an export
program that subsidized short-term export loans for manufacturing firms in India. I
estimate the effect of the credit subsidy scheme on subsidized firms by mapping the
eligible product lines to firms while controlling for firm- and sector-level differences
across firms and accounting for shocks to export demand.
Chapter 1. Governments around the world implement programs to improve
the credit access of small businesses. Evaluating the impact of policies undertaken
is important to ensure that the policies achieve the desired outcomes. However, in
the absence of randomized policy assignment and the availability of controls for the
credit demand of firms, establishing a causal link between the program eligibility and
the improvement in credit access is an econometric challenge. In the first chapter
“Could Directed Lending Programs Hurt Small Businesses? Evidence from India,” I
study the impact of an expansion in a size-based directed or preferential credit policy
that targets small businesses in India. In 2006, the Indian Government expanded
the official definition of small businesses, thereby including relatively bigger firms in
the pool of firms eligible for its large-scale directed credit program called the priority
sector lending program. The discontinuity in eligibility to the nation-wide credit
program helps identify the impact of the program across the firm-size distribution.
Larger eligible firms are likely to be favored by banks because making bigger loans
to larger firms helps banks economize on transaction costs while still meeting their
directed lending quotas. Exploiting the eligibility discontinuity and using a modified
difference-in-differences strategy, I find that the benefits of the policy intervention
flow disproportionately to the larger firms. Newly-eligible firms experience an increase
in the rate of growth of institutional credit, as well as higher investment and sales
growth. The smaller, previously-eligible firms, on the other hand, are crowded out
in the bank credit market, when compared to a reference group of ineligible firms.
The positive impact on newly-eligible firms is highly correlated with firm size, even
within the group. The financial constraints literature documents the role of banking
relationships in overcoming credit constraints for small firms, specifically, the duration
of the relationship and the multiplicity of bankers. Using the information on bankers
of the firms and the duration of each firm-bank pair, I find that the firms with longer
and multiple banking relationships experience less crowding out. While my analysis
confirms the results from the empirical literature on the positive role of longer bank
relationships and the multiplicity of bankers, I do not find evidence supporting the
relationship-lending advantage of small and local banks. These findings suggest that
the comparative advantage of small banks in relationship-lending is limited by the
cost-minimizing incentive of banks. Moreover, firms that borrow from banks that are
farther away from the mandated directed lending target experience less crowding out
as well. Smaller firms located in districts with more intense local competition from
newly-eligible firms are also crowded out more, implying that such policy expansions
could potentially worsen the existing regional disparities in access to institutional
credit across the country.
This study points to an important side effect of a well-intentioned policy interven-
tion, aimed at increasing credit access of all small firms, and simultaneously providing
banks with more lending avenues to achieve their directed lending targets. By virtue
of its design, however, it distorts the lending incentives of banks, allowing them to ex-
ploit the policy shift as an opportunity to lower transaction costs. This suggests that
in a setting with lending quotas if institutional lenders are unable to satisfactorily
lower transaction and information costs, they will make loans to the largest eligible
borrowers, whenever possible. Future policy design must be guided by research that
assesses the overall impact of existing programs, in order to develop programs that
expand access to finance while limiting economic distortions.
Chapter 2. In “The Impact of Credit Subsidies on Export Performance,” I study
the impact of an export credit intervention on the export performance of firms in the
subsidized product lines in India, both at the intensive and at the extensive margin of
exports. The Government of India formulated the Interest Rate Subvention Scheme in
2007 to reduce the cost of short-term credit for exporters in employment-intensive sec-
tors, given their important contribution to the GDP and the workforce employment.
Short-term loans of exporters are mainly working capital loans in the form of pre-
and post-shipment export credit. Between 2007 and 2013, the government announced
subsidies on short-term bank loans on a semi-annual or annual basis for specific sec-
tors or product lines. The immediate goal of the scheme was to minimize short-term
credit frictions of SMEs across all sectors, and large firms in export-oriented labor-
intensive sectors. The long-term goal of the scheme, as has been understood in recent
years when the subsidies were expanded, was to provide Indian exporters credit at
internationally competitive rates.
I construct a detailed data set which matches the balance-sheet data on medium
and large exporting firms in the Indian manufacturing sector from 2006-2013, with
their eligibility status based on products manufactured by them. To control for ex-
port demand shocks, I create a demand index that measures the product-level shocks
to export demand, aggregated across importer countries for the firms in the sam-
ple. There are three key findings in this paper. First, I find that the impact of
subsidies is estimated at about 5-8% in a difference-in-differences sense, compared
to non-subsidized firms. The subsidies are not effective in the event of a substantial
drop in world demand, as that experienced in 2009, in the aftermath of the global
financial recession. This points to the limited usefulness of credit support as a policy
tool during a major downturn. Second, the impact of credit subsidies is increasing
in pre-existing fiscal benefits enjoyed by exporting firms, implying that there is a
complementary effect of existing export incentives. The impact of the subsidy is also
highly heterogeneous across firm-specific characteristics. Larger and more productive
firms benefit to a lesser extent than their counterparts. In contrast to the findings
in the literature, firms’ financial health indicators such as liquidity and leverage do
not have any differential effect on the subsidized firms. Also, subsidized firms with
longer bank relationships benefit relatively more. Finally, I do not find any impact
on the export participation of firms, which is not unexpected given the short-term
and unanticipated nature of the subsidy scheme.
The findings from these two studies are policy relevant not only for India but
for other developing economies that implement similar policies. If government au-
thorities and regulators in India want to effectively evaluate similar credit subsidy
programs, they must be forward-looking and collect appropriate data that facilitate
the evaluation of these programs, especially for small and micro firms. Future research
evaluating credit support programs would benefit immensely from improved data on
variables such as employment, expansion in product variety and export destinations,
as well as loan-level details of firms.
To Naani
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CHAPTER 1
COULD DIRECTED LENDING PROGRAMS HURT SMALL FIRMS?
EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
Access to adequate and timely credit significantly affects the growth of small busi-
nesses (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006)). Governments and policymakers across the
world design programs to improve the credit access of small businesses. Relatively
high cost of credit, the requirement of posting collateral and limited access to equity
capital, continue to put the majority of small firms outside the net of institutional
sources of credit. In India, less than 10% of small firms have access to institutional
credit. The Government of India channels credit to small firms by way of eligibility to
a national-level directed lending program that requires all commercial banks to direct
40% of their total annual credit to targeted priority sectors. This policy, however, en-
courages banks to target larger and relatively safer eligible borrowers for two reasons.
First, larger firms are more likely to pledge higher collateral against their loans, and
hence are safer to invest in than firms that do not have sufficient assets to pledge.
Second, banks can minimize transaction costs on their directed lending portfolio by
making fewer big loans to the larger firms to achieve the mandated loan quota. Thus,
size-based directed lending policies can result in asymmetric allocation of subsidized
credit across the firm-size distribution.
In this paper, I study the effectiveness of this directed credit program by exploiting
a policy-induced variation in program eligibility, focusing on the differential impact
across the firm-size distribution. In 2006, the Government of India substantially
1
expanded the official definition of small firms. In India, firms are defined as small
based on an investment threshold. If the gross value of plant and machinery of a
firm is less than the official threshold, it is categorized as a small firm. Bank loans
made to all small firms are classified as priority sector loans. After the revision in the
definition, larger firms were included in the pool of eligible firms. The inclusion of
more firms provided banks with an opportunity to substantially expand their priority
sector lending portfolio by targeting the larger firms.
My analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I analyze the effect of the policy
change on small firms using a variant of the difference-in-differences strategy. Using
detailed balance sheet data on a panel of firms from the Prowess database, I compare
the always- and recently-eligible groups to the reference group of never-eligible firms,
controlling for firm-specific variables and demand-side factors. I find that the larger
eligible firms experience a faster rate of growth of bank credit, sales, and investment,
whereas the smaller always-eligible firms get crowded out and experience declining
growth in bank credit.1 I also find that the positive impact on the recently-eligible
firms is highly correlated with firm size even within the group. Second, I examine the
role of bank relationships in mitigating the crowding out of small firms. The literature
documents the role of bank relationships in overcoming credit constraints, specifically,
the duration of the relationship and the multiplicity of associated bankers (Berger
et al. (2001), Berger and Udell (1995)). I use firm-bank matched data, complemented
with bank-level financial variables such as the size of bank assets and banks’ distance
or shortfall from the mandated lending target. I find that firms with longer and
multiple bank relationships, and firms that borrow from banks that are farther away
from the mandated directed lending target, experience less crowding out. Third,
I try to explain the asymmetric impact of the policy intervention across the firm-
size distribution using the intensity of competition that firms face in the local credit
1 This interpretation is relative to never-eligible firms in a difference-in-differences sense.
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market. I exploit the regional heterogeneity in credit market competition at the
district level. In districts with fewer recently-eligible firms, I expect the crowding out
of smaller firms to be minimal, and vice-versa.
To test this hypothesis, I construct a data set combining data on the district-level
firm distribution from the Fourth All India MSMED Census.2 The census provides a
snapshot of firm-level attributes of the universe of registered SMEs in 2006-2007, i.e.,
the year before the policy change. The Master Office File3 maintained by the Reserve
Bank of India provides the data on the presence of bank branches in every district
in India. I compute two measures of local credit market competition, one based
on the competition from other small firms in the region, and the other based on the
presence of priority sector shortfall-bank branches. The results confirm my hypothesis
that smaller firms indeed get crowded out relatively more in districts with more
competition, compared to their counterparts in districts with less intense competition
from larger firms.
The first contribution of this paper is to show that expansions in directed credit
policies that target firms based on size crowd out the smaller firms by incentivizing
banks to favor larger firms. I find evidence of a differential impact on growth in
bank borrowings as well as firm sales and investment growth across the firm-size
distribution. My findings related to the role of multiple bank relationships and the
duration of bank relationships confirm the results from the related literature. Longer
and multiple bank relationships mitigate the crowding out of smaller firms. Always-
eligible firms that borrow from small and local banks are hurt more than those firms
that borrow from large banks. This finding suggests that in an environment with
mandated lending targets, the comparative advantage of small banks in relationship-
2 The census data can be downloaded from the website of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
Development Ministry.
3 The Master Office File can be downloaded from the website of the Reserve Bank of India. It
provides bank branch names, address, and date of opening of each bank branch in India.
3
lending is limited by the cost-minimizing incentive of lenders. My second contribution
is to assess the impact of the program exploiting regional variation in the intensity
of local credit market competition. Small firms in districts with a higher proportion
of recently-eligible competitors are hurt more by the policy expansion. Over time,
such effects could worsen the regional disparity in access to institutional credit of the
smallest firms across the country. In the absence of loan-level data matched to firms
and banks,4 it is not possible to study the effect of the credit program’s expansion on
the extensive margin.5 Due to data limitations, I can study the impact of the program
expansion only on the intensive margin. I suspect that the policy expansion has the
potential to severely hurt small firms at the extensive margin as well. These results
have policy implications not only in India, but in other developing economies that
implement similar preferential-lending policies by penalizing financial institutions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview
of the related literature and discusses the contributions of this paper. Section 2 pro-
vides the details of the institutional setting and describes the policy change. Section
3 discusses the choice of the data and the data sources. Section 4 describes the em-
pirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results of the analyses. Section 6 discusses the
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes and discusses policy implications.
1 RELATED LITERATURE
This paper relates to two main strands of the literature focusing on credit access of
small firms. First, the studies that evaluate the impact of credit policies on small firms
and analyze the role of bank relationships in overcoming credit constraints. Second,
the literature that documents the undesired effects of credit programs.
4 No regulatory authority records and maintains balance sheet data of all small firms. While the
RBI collects loan-level data from all commercial banks in India, it does not require banks to
identify borrowers and report firm-level variables such as size by assets, sales and profitability.
5 The policy expansion has the potential to hurt the credit access of always-eligible small firms
at the extensive margin much more than at the intensive margin.
4
A positive relationship between increased access to finance and firm growth has
been established by numerous studies (Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998), Ayyagari et al. (2008)). Using cross-country firm-level survey
data, Beck et al. (2005) find that among small firms, the firms reporting lower growth
rates are those firms that face greater financial constraints. Aghion et al. (2007)
find that access to credit boosts entry among small firms and helps small firms take
advantage of growth opportunities. Most studies find a stronger effect of financial
constraints on smaller firms.6 Nikaido et al. (2015) find that that enterprise size,
among other factors,7 is positively associated with access to formal credit for small
firms in the unorganized sector in India. Using a cross-section of the universe of
registered firms in India from the Fourth All India Census of Micro, Small & Medium
Enterprises (2006-2007), I analyze the relationship between firm size and institutional
credit access of small manufacturing enterprises. I find that firm size, account keeping
status and growth rate of value added, are positively associated with access to credit.8
I contribute to the literature that focuses on the evaluation of credit programs.
Lelarge et al. (2010) exploit the extension of guarantees to new sectors in France and
find that newly-eligible firms raised more external finance at lower interest rates, which
subsequently led to an increase in the probability of bankruptcy. Bach (2013) studies a
policy of bank loans made from subsidized funds to specific sectors in France and finds
evidence of increased debt-financing of targeted small firms, with no subsequent surge
in default risk. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) analyze loan-level information from one
of India’s biggest banks. They exploit a temporary policy reform and its subsequent
6 Using cross-country survey data of firms of 54 countries, Beck et al. (2005) find that financing
constraints affect firm growth more adversely among small firms relative to large firms. Oliveira
and Fortunato (2006) find that small Portuguese firms are likely to grow much faster than large
firms when their financial constraints are eased.
7 Other factors are owner’s education level, registration status, diversified business.
8 Table 1.26 in Appendix 1.B shows the external sources of credit and a breakdown between
institutional and non-institutional credit access of small firms. Only about 25% of registered
small firms reported access to informal or formal credit.
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reversal,9 that decided the eligibility threshold of Indian SMEs between 1998 and
2000. They find large effects of becoming prioritized on firms’ bank borrowings,
profit and growth. Their results however, only apply to one bank in India. Studies
have also documented the undesired or unintended effects of similar directed lending
policies. Zia (2008) uses a reversal of eligibility for subsidized export-credit to study
the impact of the program on exporting firms in Pakistan. The study finds that
while small firms reduced their sales after the reversal, the large, listed and group
firms did not suffer. Cole (2009) finds evidence of political cycles in agricultural
lending via such programs in India. A working paper by Kumar (2014) documents the
credit misallocation across agricultural and manufacturing sectors in India due to the
presence of political cycles in bank lending. A working paper by Bhue et al. (2016) is
the closest study in terms of the policy setting in this paper. They discuss the strategic
slowdown in growth of investment in newly-eligible small firms near the investment
cut-off compared to the newly-eligible small firms away from the cut-off.10 They do
not address the asymmetric impact of the policy change across firm-size distribution.
To my knowledge, this is the first study to exploit this variation in eligibility to the
directed lending program to study the impact on small firm lending and growth. I
find that compared to a reference group of never-eligible firms, newly-eligible bigger
firms experience higher rates of bank credit growth, sales, and investment, whereas
the always-eligible, smaller firms get crowded out and experience declining growth in
bank credit.
I also contribute to the remarkably diverse literature focused on the role of bank
relationships in overcoming information asymmetries and improving the credit access
of small firms. Berger and Udell (1995) find that small borrowers with longer bank
relationships pay lower interest rates and are less burdened by the need to pledge
9 In a working paper, Kapoor et al. (2012) study the causal impact of credit constraints on
exporting firms using the same temporary policy reform in India.
10 I discuss the estimated coefficients corresponding to their sample and strategy in Section 5.
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collateral. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that close ties with an institutional cred-
itor increases financing opportunities for small businesses. Hernández-Cánovas and
Mart́ınez-Solano (2006) find that SMEs that work with fewer banks obtain debt at a
lower cost. A substantial body of empirical research has also shown that small banks
are more willing to deliver bank loans to SMEs than large banks. Many of these
studies support the “Cookie Cutter vs Character” approach (Cole et al. (2004)), or
the “Small Bank Advantage” hypothesis (Berger et al. (1995), Jayaratne and Wolken
(1999), Berger and Udell (2002)), suggesting that small banks have an advantage in
small business lending either due to their access to soft-information on the borrow-
ers or through the benefits of relationship lending. While my analysis confirms the
results from the empirical literature on the positive role of longer bank relationships
and the multiplicity of bankers, I do not find evidence supporting the relationship-
lending advantage of small and local banks. My findings suggest that the comparative
advantage of small banks in relationship-lending is limited by the cost-minimizing in-
centive of bankers. To my knowledge, no previous work has analyzed the impact of
size-based directed lending policies across firm-size distribution, discussing the role of
bank relationships in mitigating the crowding out of always-eligible firms.11
2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND POLICY CHANGE
Prevalence of Directed Lending. Given the importance of small firms in the
economy, governments and regulators across the globe implement policies aimed at
improving access to credit for small businesses. Preferential or directed lending12
mandates, refinancing schemes, interest rate caps and credit guarantees are commonly
used policy tools in developing economies. Most countries implement these policies
11 It is highly likely that the banking sector benefited from this redefinition of targeted eligible
firms, given the directed lending targets in place. The analysis of the banking sector is outside
the scope of this study, primarily due to data limitations.
12 Directed lending refers to the practice of extending loans on preferential terms to specific tar-
geted sectors that have otherwise been marginalized by institutional credit.
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by either imposing constraints on the banking sector, or by having center and state
governments earmark funds to be spent towards increasing credit access of financially
constrained sectors. Table 1.1 summarizes policy tools and target sectors of select
developing economies.
Table 1.1: Preferential Lending: Policy Tools and Targeted Sectors
Country Targeted Sectors Policy Tool
Bolivia SMEs, Social Housing, High Productivity Sectors Lending Quota, Interest Cap
Thailand Small-scale Industries, Agriculture Lending Quota (20%)
Indonesia SMEs Lending Quota (20%)
Philippines SMEs Lending Quota (8%)
India SMEs, Agriculture, Housing, Weaker Sections Lending Quota (40%)
Vietnam SMEs, Agriculture, Exports, Technology Interest Rate Cap
Malaysia SMEs Interest Rate Cap
Sources: World Bank report Finance in South Asia 2010, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
report Asia Focus 2014, author’s press search.
Banking System in India. In India, the directed lending policy is implemented
via the commercial banks. India’s banking system is organized into commercial,
regional-rural and co-operative banks. Both public13 and private banks fall under
the commercial bank category. Public banks are bifurcated into the State Bank
Group and the Nationalized Banks Group. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the
central bank of India. As of 2017, the banking system consisted of 26 public sector
banks, 25 private sector banks, 43 foreign banks, 56 regional rural banks, 1,589 urban
cooperative banks and 93,550 rural cooperative banks, in addition to cooperative
credit institutions. The public sector banks control about 72% of commercial banking
assets, followed by domestic private sector banks and foreign banks controlling about
21% and 7%, respectively.
Priority Sector Program in India. All domestic commercial banks in India
are mandated to direct 40% of their total annual credit to sectors demarcated as
13 The government is the majority shareholder of public banks comprising about 72% of the market.
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priority sectors. The priority sectors include sectors impacting large sections of the
population, the weaker sections of the society and the sectors which are employment-
intensive such as agriculture, and micro and small enterprises. Over the years, the
list of priority sector eligible borrowers has been expanded to include low-income
housing, education, export credit and renewable energy sector. The Reserve Bank of
India announces and updates the list of priority sectors. It also informs banks about
internal targets in addition to the overall 40% target, and about loan amount limits
associated priority sector loans. Loans made to micro and small enterprises across
all industries count as priority sector advances. To ensure fair distribution of credit
to the most vulnerable segments, within-category internal targets are mandated for
agriculture and loans to weaker sections. Table 1.2 lists the sub-targets of priority
sector lending during the year 2006-2007. While sub-targets for micro enterprises are
allotted, no such safeguard has been put in place for the small enterprises.
Table 1.2: Priority Sector Lending Targets at Sector and Sub-Sector Level
Sector Sub-sector Target Internal Target
Agriculture – 18%
Weaker Sections – 10%
Micro & Small Enterprises (MSEs) –
— Micro Enterprises I 0.0 - 0.5 INR Mln 40% of total MSE
— Micro Enterprises II 0.5 - 2.5 INR Mln 20% of total MSE
— Small Enterprises 0.5 - 2.5 INR Mln –
Total Priority Sector 40%
Note: Micro Enterprises Groups I and II correspond to micro firms with investment in plant
and machinery upto INR 0.5 Million and between INR 0.5-2.5 Million, respectively.
Source: RBI Master Circular, PSL Targets and Classification, July 2013.
Banks are free to set the interest rate on priority sector loans based on the borrowers’
risk assessment.14 Shortfalls from announced targets are closely monitored by the
14 Specific borrower categories are offered loans on terms decided by the Reserve Bank of India.
For most categories, the RBI Priority Sector Guidelines do not lay down a preferential rate.
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central bank officials. Banks falling short of the target are required to lend the
shortfall amount to Rural Development Bonds at very low interest rates decided by
the RBI on a quarterly basis. If a bank repeatedly falls short of meeting this target,
it risks being disallowed from expanding its branch network across the country.
Policy Change. The regulatory change that I exploit is the MSMED Act of
2006. In October 2006, the Parliament of India enacted the Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act or the MSMED Act.15 The Act provided a variety of
facilities such as improved credit access, skill and training development, technology
upgradation, market linkages and marketing support. With the enactment of the
MSMED Act, the upward revision of the investment ceiling led to an expansion in
the pool of firms eligible for directed lending, thus improving credit access for the
recently-eligible small firms. The always-eligible firms retained eligibility, as usual.
Thus, the revision in the investment ceiling led to an expansion in the pool of small
firms eligible for directed lending,16 as summarized in Table 1.3.
In addition to the revision in the size-determining upper bound, the policy inter-
vention also pushed the banking sector to achieve a 20% year-on-year growth of loans
made to SMEs, and ultimately double the credit available to SMEs in the next five
years. The year-wise growth in bank credit to the micro and small firms sector is
shown in Figure 1.1. Bank credit to these firms did more than double between 2007
and 2012, which is touted as a policy success.17 However, in the absence of a demar-
cation between always-eligible and the recently-eligible firms, it is unclear which type
of firms generated this growth in credit, i.e., the distinction between always-eligible
and recently-eligible groups’ bank credit growth before and after the year of the policy
15 A different set of rules were laid out for the manufacturing and service sectors. This study focuses
on the manufacturing sector. Capital investment cut-offs for manufacturing sector small firms
were defined based on investment in plant and machinery.
16 The details of the threshold definition and priority sector eligibility can be found on the website
of the Reserve Bank of India at www.rbi.org.in/scripts/ViewMasCirculardetails.
17 The initial jump seen in 2008 is partially due to inclusion of service-sector small firms in the
priority sector.
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change can not be observed in Figure 1.1.
Table 1.3: Revision in the Definition of Small Firms due to the Policy Change
Policy Timing Firm Size Criterion Eligible Group of Firms
(Value of plant & machinery)
Before 2007 2.5 - 10 INR Million Always-Eligible Firms
After 2007 2.5 - 10 INR Million Always-Eligible Firms
& &
10 - 50 INR Million Recently-Eligible Firms
Notes: The firm-size determining investment threshold is defined in terms of value of plant and
machinery installed. Bank loans to small firms are eligible as priority sector lending.
Source: Reserve Bank of India public announcements via Master Circulars.
Figure 1.1: Growth in the Bank Credit Flowing to Micro and Small Enterprises.
Source: Annual Report of Micro and Small Enterprises for the year 2011-2012.
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3 DATA
Selection of the Data. I focus on changes in the access to institutional credit and
on the investment growth of firms before and after the implementation of the policy
expansion. The main financial variables of interest are bank borrowings, investment
in capital and total borrowings. While the ideal data to use in this setting are firm-
bank matched loan records from before and after the policy change, such data are
unavailable.18 In the absence of the ideal data, I use firm-level audited balance sheet
data that include information on firm-bank relationships. I also construct a data set of
credit market competition measures at the district and pin-code level, using publicly
available census data, and RBI’s bank-branch network directory. I study a panel of
firms that reported their financial information in all the years in the chosen period.
I winsorize the data based on total sales, total assets and total invested capital. I
exclude all firms that reported exports greater than 10% of total sales.19
Data Sources. I use data on firms, banks and district-level data on small firm
distribution and bank branch networks. I also use industry-level aggregate variables,
industry-level deflators and wholesale price index. For the firm-level data, I use the
Prowess database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Financial
information is extracted from audited financial statements, and the stock and credit-
rating data are compiled from other published sources. Prowess provides time-series
on firm-level bank borrowing and total institutional borrowings, along with a break-
down of the firms’ institutional borrowings by the source. Gross value of plant and
machinery of a firm is used to categorize it into a group. Data on firm-bank relation-
18 The Reserve Bank of India does not record such data. Due to a change in the firm-size definition,
the loan accounts information submitted by all commercial banks to the Reserve Bank of India
was no longer comparable before and after the policy change. After the definition update, bank
records also re-classified recently-eligible firms loans to ‘small’ in addition to the always-eligible
firms’ loans, without any way to identify always-eligible from recently-eligible borrowers.
19 Exporting firms are excluded because a different set of credit rate policies and guarantees apply
to exporters. Moreover, starting in 2007, SME exporters were eligible for a 2% interest rate
subsidy which was later increased to 3%. Such differences could distort the true analysis.
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ships are also available in the Prowess database. I merge the sample of firms with its
bankers, as well as the bank-specific variables for the time period studied. Prowess
also classifies firms by industry according to the NIC code,20 which is the Indian
equivalent of the SIC classification scheme.21 An alternate source of data is the An-
nual Survey of Industries (ASI) surveys at the factory level, but they do not capture
audited financial information of the associated firms. The ASI also does not report
bank borrowings at the factory-level or the gross value of plant and machinery across
the entire sample. Bank loan officers are more likely to use audited financial data to
calculate the cut-offs determining firm size, i.e., whether a firm is small, medium or
large by the official definition,22 hence the choice of the Prowess database.
Data on district-level firm distribution is from the Fourth All India MSMED Cen-
sus.23 The census provides a snapshot of firm-level attributes of the universe of
registered SMEs in 2006-2007, i.e., the year before the policy change. For district
and pin-code level data on bank-branch networks, I rely on the Master Office File
maintained by the Reserve Bank of India.24 Based on these two additional datasets,
I compute two measures of local competition for the firms in my sample. The first
measure is based on the competition from other small firms in a district, and the
second measure on the proportion of priority sector shortfall branches in a district.
20 I use two-digit industry classification from the National Industrial Classification 2008 for India.
21 Standard Industrial Classification is a four-digit industry classifier used in USA and UK.
22 This was confirmed by officials at the Reserve Bank of India as well as with the managers of
two Indian banks: State Bank of India and HDFC Bank.
23 Data obtained from the MSMED Ministry Official Website.
24 I observe the exact branch names, address and the date of opening of each branch at the pin-code
level in India in the Master Office File published by the Reserve Bank of India.
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Data on industry aggregates from 2003-2009 are taken from the Historical Time
Series collected by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. I use
the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) series to deflate nominal variables.25 Further details
of data sources are provided in Appendix 1.A.
Sample Period and Comparison Groups. The MSMED Act of 2006 was
implemented midway through the financial year26 in October, 2006. I use the following
financial year 2007-2008 as the first year after the policy change, until 2009-2010.
I choose this ending year because starting 2010 two important regulatory changes
were implemented which are likely to distort the true picture of the crowding-out of
always-eligible firms: the deregulation of the then current interest rate regime, and the
introduction of a credit guarantee scheme targeted at small firm credit access. This
policy revision brought a huge number of small firms across all industries, regions and
ownership types, under the priority sector. I use the variation in the status of firms to
estimate the exposure to the program, by comparing firms across industries in three
groups, namely, always-eligible, recently-eligible and never-eligible groups. Since firm
size is determined by the nominal value of investment in plant and machinery,27 I use
this criterion to split the firms into the three groups. There is insufficient coverage on
micro enterprises for any meaningful empirical analysis.28 I control for group-specific
time trends.
Descriptive Statistics. In Table 1.4, I present the descriptive statistics of the
sample of firms in this study for the financial year 2006-2007. I assign firms to one of
25 Bank loans and debt data are deflated by the All-Commodities WPI, firm-level variables such as
sales, assets, profits, and industry-level aggregates are deflated by the corresponding industry-
specific WPI.
26 The financial year in India runs from April 1 - March 31.
27 In the absence of mandatory disclosure of number of employees in annual reports, this definition
of size limits the use of accounting tricks to subvert the intent of the categorization, and bankers
can access this information through audited reports.
28 In a another paper, I am trying to separately study the effect on district-level micro-enterprise
credit using confidential district-industry-level data on bank credit of micro firms, made acces-
sible by the Reserve Bank of India.
14
the three groups: Always Eligible, Recently Eligible or Never Eligible,29 based on the
gross plant and machinery in 2006-2007. In the same year, the average sales of the
always-eligible firms is about one-half of the average sales of recently-eligible firms.
The average investment in fixed assets for always-eligible firms is less than half of that
of recently-eligible firms. The average utilization seems almost uniform across all the
groups, while average profitability is decreasing as we go from the never-eligible to
the always-eligible firms. The never-eligible firms, on the other hand are bigger by
a factor of about twenty vis-a-vis the recently-eligible firms. On average, the share
of bank borrowings is decreasing in firm-size, i.e., always-eligible firms are relatively
more dependent on bank credit, followed by recently- and never-eligible firms.
Data Exclusions. I exclude two types of firms from the analyses. I exclude
exporters from the analysis because all SME exporters enjoyed access to subsidized
credit via an Interest Rate Subsidy Program starting 2007.30 The summary statistics
for all firms, including exporters, is presented in Table 1.17 in Appendix 1.B. I also
adjust for firms from the 41 items covering broad groups of sectors - Hosiery, Hand
Tools, Drugs & Pharmaceuticals, Stationery and Sports Goods, whose investment
cut-off was enhanced to INR 10 Million in 2001-2002.31 The details of such bank
credit policies are periodically announced via Master Circulars issued by the Reserve
Bank of India. I make the above exclusions after carefully reading these circulars, and
obtaining clarifications from the officials at the Banking Statistics Department at the
Reserve Bank of India. In the district-level variables, I drop two states, Jammu &
Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh, due to data unavailability.
Bank-level Data on Small Loans. From a bank’s perspective, the expansion
in the definition of small firms should ease the priority sector lending constraint, thus,
allowing the bank to make loans that are less risky and/or have lower transaction costs
29 Always Eligible (INR 2.5− 10), Recently Eligible (INR 10− 50), Never Eligible (>50)
30 The scheme was announced in five phases via public circulars: Interest Rate Subvention Scheme.
31 Details included in master circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India.
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in the aggregate. The opportunity to reallocate their resources away from the smaller
firms may help reduce the share of non-performing loans in the small loans category.
However, due to the unavailability of banks’ loan-level data identifying firms by size,
such an analysis can not be attempted. Investigating the effect of the policy on bank
profitability is an interesting area for future work, if regulators were to make such
data available for the purpose of research. Anecdotal evidence suggests that internal
policy directives were pushing banks to generate at least 20% year-on-year growth in
small firm credit, which was a very challenging for most bankers.32
Preliminary Evidence. I plot the sum of bank borrowings and total sales
for the always-eligible and recently-eligible groups33 using the firms in my panel. On
first glance, from Figure 1.2, it seems that the stock of bank borrowings and total
sales of the recently-eligible firms rose much more compared to always-eligible firms.
However, these are unconditional sums, and no causal claim can follow from these
trends without controlling for demand-side factors and firm-level variables.
32 Source: Interview with Ranjana Kumar, Former CMD, Indian Bank; Vigilance Commissioner.
33 Both the figures are calculated after deflating by the Wholesale Price Index. The trend for the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.2: Sum of Bank Loans (top) and Sales (bottom) of the Small Firm Groups.




I investigate the differential effect of the policy change on the growth of deflated bank
borrowings ∆yist of firm i, industry s, time t with the following empirical model:34
























Always Eligible (Plant & machinery value 2.5 - 10 INR Million)
Recently Eligible (Plant & machinery value 10 - 50 INR Million)
Never Eligible (Plant & machinery value > 50 INR Million)
The group indicator g i corresponds to each firm’s assigned group based on in-
vestment thresholds in 2005-2006, which is the the year before the enactment of the
policy change. The indicator Aftert is equal to 1 for years after the year of the
policy change. The firm-level controls Xit include firm size (total sales), total fixed
assets, profitability ratio and the default ratio.35 I include firm fixed effects to con-
trol for time-invariant firm characteristics, year fixed-effects to account for aggregate
macroeconomic shocks, and industry aggregates IOst , i.e., output and industry out-
put growth,36 to control for industry-specific time trends that may affect the outcome
variable, and εist is an i.i.d. error term, with E(εist| Xit, IOst,1(Group gi), t) = 0.
The coefficients of interest β
g
1 capture the relative differential effect in terms of
34 Changes in growth are computed as the difference of log of the level variables. The group
indicators are absorbed by the firm-fixed effects and are ommitted while running the regressions.
35 Detailed description of these firm-level controls is available in Appendix 1.A.
36 Two-digit NIC industry codes categorize firms’ industry. Industry output and industry output
growth at the two-digit industry level are obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries.
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the growth of bank borrowings, due to the change in priority sector eligibility of firms




1 ), vis-a-vis the reference
group of never-eligible firms. The specification in Equation 1.1 allows for different
intercepts and different linear trends across the three groups. This specification helps
control for any other policy or macroeconomic changes that occurred at the time
of this policy change, and which could potentially affect the demand and supply of
debt at the group level. This approach relates well to previously adopted empirical
strategies in the non-experimental program evaluation literature based on multiple
pre and post treatment periods, and is an improvement over the simple difference-in-
differences (DD) method since it controls for different time trends across groups.37
Following the literature, I focus on the first difference in logs of deflated bank
borrowings, since bank borrowings are a stock variable and known to be persistent,
following a fat-tailed distribution. For similar reasons, I use the same transformation
in the other outcomes as well. I follow Bertrand et al. (2004) in their treatment of
clustering at the level of treatment for difference-in-differences type estimation, and
cluster standard errors at the level of the treatment status, i.e., at the firm-level. I
also estimate other standard errors38 and find that the firm-level clustering produces
the most conservative standard errors.
Non-bank Borrowings. I estimate the same specification given by Equation
1.1 with growth of other borrowings as the dependent variable, to check if the recently-
eligible firms simply used bank borrowings to substitute for other financing. These
other borrowings include all other debt of a firm obtained from sources other than




1 is indicative of evidence in favor
of firms substituting the increased bank loans for other sources of credit.
37 Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) employ a similar empirical specification to study the
employment effects of a Working Families’ Tax Credit in Britain, comparing lone mothers and
single women without children.
38 Conventional, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustering at the two-digit industry level.
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Firm-size Effects. In order to test the presence of differential impact of the
policy change across the firms in the recently-eligible group, I divide the group into
terciles, based on the gross value of plant and machinery pre-policy change, which
helps study the impact within the treated group. As earlier, I winsorize at the 1%
level around all the constructed groups. I estimate the following specification:




















stγ + ηi + λt + εist
(1.2)
As before, the group indicator g̃i corresponds to each firm’s assigned group based
on investment thresholds in 2005-2006, but the recently-eligible group split into three
sub-groups in the increasing order of the value of investment in plant and machinery:
RE1, RE2 and RE3, i.e., the first, second and third tercile, respectively.
1(Group g̃i) =

AE (Plant & machinery value 2.5 - 10 INR Million)
RE1 (Plant & machinery value 10.3 - 19.9 INR Million)
RE2 (Plant & machinery value 19.9 - 35.4 INR Million)
RE3 (Plant & machinery value 35.4 - 49.9 INR Million)
NE (Plant & machinery value > 50 INR Million)








1 capturing the differential
effect across the sub-groups withing the treated group. As in the earlier specifications,
I include firm and year fixed effects, and industry-year controls.
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Real Outcomes. To analyze the impact on real outcomes of the firms across
the always-, recently- and never-eligible groups following the policy change, I study
their pre and post growth in investment and total sales. I use the same specification
as Equation 1.1 for the baseline estimation and then switch to Equation 1.2 to look at





capture the differential effect of the change in priority sector eligibility of firms, on
investment and sales growth. I repeat the estimations with the recently-eligible group









• For the investment-growth regression the dependent variable is the ratio of
investment to capital, Ii,s,t/Ki,s,t−1. I control for the cash flow to capital ratio,
Cash Flowist
Ki,s,t−1
and the lagged sales growth, ∆sales i,s,t−1.
• For the sales-growth regression the dependent variable is the growth of sales,
i.e., the change in log(sales), ∆salesi,s,t. I control for one-period lagged cash
flow to capital ratio Cash Flowi,s,t−1
Ki,s,t−2
.
An interesting feature of this quasi-experiment is the coincidental occurrence of
the post-Act period with the onset of an important recession. While most commercial
banks in India were not directly exposed to the financial recession, the simultaneous
liquidity crunch and economic slowdown eroded net worth of Indian banks as well as
firms. Had the banks’ and firms’ net worth been higher for macroeconomic reasons,
it would be difficult to control for dampening credit constraints in the economy. This
period of slowdown in bank lending activity as well as manufacturing growth lends
these estimates stronger external validity.
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4.2 THE ROLE OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS
The impact of the policy change across firm groups can also differ based on the type
of bankers, as well as the characteristics of the firm-bank relationships. I exploit
the matched firm-bank sub-sample in the Prowess database. The database provides
the list of banker(s) for a subset of firms for every year, as reported in the firms’
annual report.39 I characterize each firm’s bank type based on the associated banks’
ownership and size, and each firm’s bank relationship type based on duration of the
bank relationship as well as the presence of multiple bank relationships.40 I denote
bank type or relationship type variable by τi. The definition of τi varies depending on
the criterion being assessed.
Firm-lender relationships are typically expected to help resolve market failures
and are known to be especially important for small firms. Bank relationships can
potentially reveal otherwise private information about borrowers, that can either help
relax financial constraints of small firms, or further constrain them. I investigate the
effect of the duration of the bank relationship(s), and the effect of the having multiple
bank relationships as opposed to a single bank relationship.
Duration of Relationship(s). Small firms likely benefit from longer relation-
ships in the face of large information asymmetries with outside investors. However,
longer associations can accompany high switching costs and hold-up issues. The di-
rection or magnitude of the crowding out due by duration of firm-bank relationships
for small businesses thus remains ambiguous.
Multiple Bank Relationships. Firms build multiple bank relationships to
protect themselves against hold-up rents inherent among exclusive bank relationships.
39 Since data on bankers is not a mandatory disclosure for firms per the Indian Companies Act, I
can only study a sub-sample of firms.
40 I do not expect the loan growth across never-eligible firms distinguished by relationship type
to have been affected by this policy change choose this group to be the reference group. The
results do not change if I switch the base to never-eligible firms split by above the median or
below the median firm relationship type. These regression results are available on request.
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Incumbent banks may be unwilling to increase lending to smaller or younger firms
due to poor performance in the past or due to insufficient collateral, or perhaps due
to a change in the bank’s incentives to make fewer small loans due to a shift in
the priority sector lending constraints, thus, inhibiting growth opportunities of small
firms. Multiple bank relationships could mitigate the crowding out effect for the
smallest firms, and possibly benefit the relatively larger firms. At the same time,
having multiple bankers could in itself be a sign of good firm health.
I measure the duration of bank-firm relationships and the number of bankers for
each firm.41 For firms that report more than one bank per firm-year, the relationship
duration measure is based on the median duration among the matched firm-bank
pairs.42 I assign firms in each group to either above or below the median firm. For the
duration of relationship measure, τi can take {Long, Short}, where Long and Short
correspond to above or below the median firm’s duration of relationship in every
group. Similarly, for the number of bankers measure, τi can take {Single, Multiple},
where Single and Multiple correspond to firms with only one banker and firms with
more than one banker.























+ ηi + λt + εist
(1.3)
As before, the coefficients of interest are in βg,τ where τ is the relationship type
being analyzed and g is the group indicator. I present the estimated coefficients from
41 The availability of the data is from the 1990s and extends to recent years, but I restrict the
series to the time period relevant for the study.
42 For the relationship duration measure, only firm-bank pairs that occurred in adjacent years
were counted as recurring pairs. For the expansion in number of bankers measure, I construct
a binary variable indicating whether a firm expanded the number of relationships after 2007.
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estimating the model in Equation 1.3, with the never-eligible firms as the base group.
Next, I study the impact of the policy change based on two important characteristics
of banks, namely the priority sector lending shortfall of banks and size of banks.
Bank Directed Lending Constraint. All commercial banks are mandated
to achieve their priority sector lending targets. However, not all banks are able to
meet these targets. In fact, some banks have historically never met the mandated
target. The aggregate shortfall of the banking sector in meeting the lending quota
are depicted in Figure 1.3. Banks falling short of the target are required to lend
the shortfall amount to Rural Development Bonds at very low interest rates decided
by the RBI periodically. This penalty encourages directed lending deficient banks
to seek eligible borrowers. Given the opportunity to expand their directed lending
portfolio, the high shortfall banks may try to aggressively increase loans to the larger
eligible borrowers, but may not be in a position to lose their existing always-eligible
borrowers. Using information on the shortfall status of matched bankers, I test for
the effect of this constraint on crowding out of small firms.
Bank Size. Another aspect driving small business lending is the size of banks.
Smaller and more local banks tend to have a comparative advantage in relationship
lending since they have better local presence and access to soft information on bor-
rowers. Large banks, on the other hand, may not be as suitable for such lending
due to higher monitoring costs of small loans, and as a result, require high collateral
to provide small business credit. This asymmetry in the nature of lending has been
termed “Cookie Cutter Vs Character” approach in the literature (Cole et al. (2004)).
I test whether relationship-lending plays a role in reducing the crowding out of the
smallest firms.
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Figure 1.3: Share of Priority Sector Credit in Total Credit of the Indian Banking Sector.
Source: Data available in reports published by the RBI in the years 2011 and 2012.
In the sub-sample with matched firm-bank pairs, each firm’s bank type is denoted
by τi,t = {High Shortfall, Low Shortfall} or {Small Bank, Big Bank}. For firms that
report more than one bank per firm-year, bank type is determined by aggregating all
bank-firm pairs and assigning the type based on the median ratio of target shortfall or
bank size for each group43. The indicator variable 1(Bank Type τi) is the aggregated
bank type of a firm for the 2004-2009 period. I use the following specification:44
43 The associated bankers and their ownership type is quite persistent across this time period.
44 As a check, I also introduce both types of never-eligible firms based on their associated banks
and find a statistically insignificant coefficient.
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+ ηi + λt + εist
(1.4)
The coefficients of interest are βg,τ for bank type τ and firm group g. I do not
expect the lending across never-eligible firms distinguished by associated bank type
to have been affected by this policy change.
4.3 THE ROLE OF LOCAL COMPETITION
To estimate the importance of competition on the differential impact of directed lend-
ing policies across the firm-size distribution, I examine the characteristics of the local
institutional credit markets in India. The spatial distribution of firms as well as bank
branches at the district-level provides cross-sectional variation in the competitiveness
of each local credit market. In districts with fewer recently-eligible firms competing
for directed credit, I expect the relatively smaller always-eligible firms to be crowded
out less, and vice-versa. This is precisely because in these districts there are fewer
recently-eligible firms that banks may favor. To test this hypothesis, I construct a
data set combining data on the district-level firm distribution from the Fourth All
India MSMED Census available with the MSMED Ministry. The census provides
a snapshot of firm-level attributes of the universe of registered SMEs in 2006-2007,
exactly the year before the policy change. I combine this cross-sectional data set
with the district-level bank branch locations obtained from the Master Office File
maintained by the Reserve Bank of India.45
45 I observe the exact bank branch names, address, and date of opening of each bank branch in
India at the pin code level in the Master Office File published by the Reserve Bank of India.
27
Measuring Local Competition. I measure local credit market competition
from other eligible small firms at the district level as the ratio of the number of
recently-eligible firms to the total eligible small firms that already have access to
bank credit.46 Firms in the census can be assigned a category based on the value of
plant and machinery reported for 2006-2007. I calculate a local competition index for
each district d, and based on the median of this index I assign the local competition
measure as {High, Low}.
Local Competitiond =
Number of Recently-Eligible Firms in District d
Number of Total Eligible Firms in District d
(1.5)
Measuring Local Banking Constraints. I also construct a measure based
on priority sector lending shortfall of banks at the district level. Using data on priority
sector lending of bank b at the national level, I calculate the directed lending shortfall
distance of banks from the mandated targets. Then using data on bank branch
presence in district d, I calculate the interaction of the shortfall distance of bank i and
an indicator variable denoting branch b of bank i. I divide this expression by the total
number of bank branches b in district d to obtain an average measure of the banks’
priority sector constraints in the local credit market. Again, based on the median of
this average, I assign the local constraint measure as {High Shortfall, Low Shortfall}.




b∈d 1(Branchb,i)× Shortfall of bank i
Number of Total Bank Branches in District d
(1.6)
46 I also construct the local competition measure using the total firms irrespective of bank credit





Effect on Bank Borrowings. In Table 1.5, I present the baseline results of the
estimation of Equation 1.1. After controlling for firm-specific factors and for time
trends, recently-eligible firms’ bank loans grew about 19.2 percentage points more
after the policy change relative to the reference category of never-eligible firms. In
contrast, the growth in bank loans of always-eligible firms decreased by 25.2 percent-
age points in relative terms. It is interesting to note the magnitude of these coefficients
despite a negative trend in the data for recently-eligible firms and a positive trend
for always-eligible firms. These results also confirm the evidence from the rapidly
growing sum of bank borrowings of recently-eligible firms in the sample compared to
the stagnating always-eligible firms as presented in Figure 1.2.
Effect on Non-Bank Borrowings. In Table 1.6, I present the results of
estimates from the regression in Equation 1.1, replacing the dependent variable with
growth in other borrowings comprising all other debt obtained from institutional
sources other than banks, including long-term and short-term borrowings, and trade
credit from suppliers. For credit from other financial institutions, the coefficient on
the post-policy period variable for recently-eligible firms is statistically significant
and indicates an increase in other borrowings by about 4.1 percentage points. The
recently-eligible firms do not use the increase in bank credit to substitute for other
sources of institutional financing. The coefficient on the always-eligible post-policy
variable is positive but not significant. For trade credit, the second largest source
of finance for small firms (after internal funds, and followed by bank credit), I find
a statistically significant increase of 14 percentage points in the growth rate for the
always-eligible firms and a negative but statistically insignificant change for recently-
eligible firms.
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Table 1.5: Impact of the Policy Change on the Growth Rate of Bank Borrowings
Variable (∆y t,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After -0.036 -0.141 -0.252**
(0.061) (.094) (0.119)
Recently Eligible × After 0.066* 0.176** 0.192**
(0.039) (0.069 ) (0.086)
Always Eligible × t 0.037 0.078*
(0.030) (0.045)
Recently Eligible × t -0.038* -0.056*
(0.019) (0.029)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the baseline estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to 2009 on the
growth of bank borrowings across the firm groups, corresponding to Equation 1.1. The dependent
variable is change in log of bank borrowings. The indicator Aftert equals 1 for years after 2006-2007,
the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size, fixed assets and profitability are log(sales),
growth(fixed assets) and the EBITDA ratio, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects, as well as
industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated. All borrowings are deflated using the WPI, and
firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific deflators.
Effect across Firm Size within the Treated Group Table 1.7 presents
the results of estimating Equation 1.2. The recently-eligible group is categorized into
terciles (RE1, RE2 and RE3), to analyze whether firm-size variation, even within the
recently-eligible group, made a significant difference in growth of bank loans.47 I find
that the upper tercile RE3 firms experience the biggest jump in growth of bank loans
of about 23 percentage points, followed by the second to largest group, the middle
tercile (RE2) by 25.4 percentage points, in relative terms. The bank loan growth
of always-eligible firms decreased by 25.1 percentage points. These results point to
the disparity even within the recently-eligible group in terms of loan growth due to
changing lending incentives towards the larger recently-eligible firms.
47 These coefficients are estimated relative to the reference group, i.e., the never-eligible firms that
did not enjoy the priority sector privileges before or after the policy change.
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Table 1.6: Impact of Policy Change on Growth Rate of Other Borrowings
Variable (∆y t,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Other Financial Institutions
Always Eligible × After 0.007 0.045* 0.033
(0.034) (0.027) (0.021)
Recently Eligible × After 0.009 0.071** 0.041*
(0.048) (0.033) (0.024)
Panel B: Trade Credit
Always Eligible × After 0.169*** 0.149** 0.143**
(0.060) (0.069) (0.071)
Recently Eligible × After -0.042** -0.038** -0.037
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024)
Number Of Observations 9,192 9,192 8,820
Group-level Time Trends No Yes Yes
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The dependent variable is change in log of other borrowings. Trade credit corresponds to liabilities
due in the next twelve months for purchase of goods, services and expenses from suppliers, as well
as bills payable. All other variables are same as in the baseline results in Table 1.5.
Due to data restrictions, I can only estimate the differential impact of a policy
push on the intensive margin. Given that less than 10% of small firms have access
to institutional finance in India, this poses a huge concern for complete rationing of
always-eligible firms, especially for those firms without access to formal credit.48
Effect on Real Outcomes In Table 1.8, I report the coefficients from esti-
mating Equation 1.3 and 1.4, i.e., the real effects of the policy change until 2009
controlling for cash flow and sales growth. The recently-eligible firms experience an
increase in both investment and sales growth, in a difference-in-differences sense, by
about 3.1 and 5.1 percentage points, respectively. The sign of β2 for always-eligible
48 The Reserve Bank of India maintains aggregate loan accounts in the banking system but
doesn’t record firm-level characteristics, making it impossible to track the always-eligible and
recently-eligible groups’ loan growth separately before and after the policy change.
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Table 1.7: Impact of Policy Change using Recently-Eligible Sub-groups
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After -0.036 -0.141 -0.251**
(0.061) (0.098) (0.119)
Recently Eligible (1st Tercile) × After 0.168** 0.281** 0.080
(0.066) (0.111) (0.149)
Recently Eligible (2nd Tercile) × After 0.009 0.185* 0.254*
(0.058) (0.106) (0.133)
Recently Eligible (3rd Tercile) × After 0.038 0.079 0.227**
(0.063) (0.109) (0.110)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Group-level Time Trends No Yes Yes
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The dependent variable is change in log of bank borrowings. The REi is split into terciles - RE1,
RE2 and RE3. All other variables are same as in the baseline results in Table 1.5.
firms is negative, although statistically insignificant. This magnitude is very much
in line with results from Banerjee and Duflo (2014) and Kapoor et al. (2012), who
study previous eligibility changes for a similar credit program for small firms in India.
This implies that there is evidence that the recently-eligible firms increased both sales
and investment at a faster rate in a relative sense, compared to the control group,
after the policy change. However, there is no evidence indicating the presence of a
corresponding slowdown for the always-eligible group. In order to examine this result,
I investigate changes in two important firm-level variables that could absorb the de-
crease in the growth of bank credit, and the increase in the use of trade credit, namely,
changes in the inventory stock and profitability. I find that the always-eligible firms
exhibit a decrease in profitability whereas the recently-eligible group exhibit an in-
crease. Thus, it is likely that the policy affected the bottom line of the always-eligible
firms in the two years following the change, as a result of an increase in credit-related
costs.
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Table 1.8: Impact of Policy Change on Investment and Sales Growth
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆sales t Profitability
Always Eligible × After 0.011 -0.039 -0.068***
(0.017) (.094) (0.016)












Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423 9,423
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes†
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
† indicates that the firm controls corresponding to this regression exclude the EBITDA ratio. The
dependent variables are the investment-to-capital ratio and total sales growth. All other variables
are same as in the baseline results in Table 1.5.
Table 1.9 reports the coefficients from estimating Equation 1.2 but for the effect
on real outcomes across the always- and recently-eligible terciles (RE1, RE2 and RE3)
or groups demarcated by the median recently-eligible firm (above the median / below
the median firm).49 The coefficients in Table 1.9 are comparable to the results in the
analysis presented in Bhue et al. (2016). The authors compare the bottom and top
terciles of only the recently-eligible firms (RE1 and RE3) using only those recently-
eligible firm groups in the regression, and find a slowdown in the growth of investment
by about 5 percentage points in a relative sense. They do not include or report the
coefficient on the dummy for the middle tercile. Using all small firms as well as a
reference category of never-eligible firms, I find this difference-in-differences estimate
to be larger for the top tercile as in their analysis, but the difference I observe is
around 2.2 percentage points.
49 The median and tercile demarcated groups are based on value of firms’ plant and machinery.
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Table 1.9: Impact of Policy Change on Investment and Sales Growth by
Sub-groups
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆Sales t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Always Eligible × After 0.011 0.011 -0.039 -0.039
(0.017) (0.017) (0.042) (0.042)
Recently Eligible (1st Tercile) × After 0.056*** 0.053
(0.019) (0.042)
Recently Eligible (2nd Tercile) × After 0.00003 0.047
(0.018) (0.041)
Recently Eligible (3rd Tercile) × After 0.034** 0.051**
(0.017) (0.026)
Recently Eligible (< Median) × After 0.039** 0.054
(0.015) (0.034)
Recently Eligible (> Median) × After 0.021 0.045
(0.015) (0.037)
Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423 9,423 9,423
Firm, Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The dependent variables are the investment-to-capital ratio and total sales growth. The REi is split
by the terciles or by the median. All other variables are same as in the baseline results in Table 1.5.
On the middle tercile, I find a coefficient near zero, albeit statistically insignificant.
This result is not explained by the strategic slowdown intuition suggested in their
paper. The coefficient on the middle tercile is not reported in the robustness results
of the paper.50 Hence, there is no explanation provided for absence of at least some
investment growth post the policy change for the middle tercile, even if the slower
growth of the top tercile is strategic. I split the recently-eligible group into two groups
(below and above the median firm) and find no evidence indicative of a strategic
investment slowdown. In Table 1.22 in Appendix 1.A, I repeat these regressions
using alternate industry-time controls and find very similar results.
50 This is for the most recent version of the working paper in 2017.
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5.2 THE ROLE OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS
To investigate the impact of the policy change across firm groups based on firms’ bank
relationships, I exploit the the firm-bank matched sample. In the baseline estimation
for the sample of firms matched to their bankers, I find that the always-eligible firms
experience a slowdown in growth of about 41 percentage points, while the recently-
eligible firms experience growth in bank borrowings of about 22 percentage points.
Table 1.10: Summary of Bank Relationship(s) of Small Firms from 2004-2009
Bank Relationship(s) Always Eligible Recently Eligible
Total Firms 148 380
Duration of Bank Relationship(s)
Median Duration 4 4
% Firms With Duration ≥ 6 years 26% 34%
Multiple Bank Relationships
Median # Bankers 1 1
% With Unchanged # Bankers After 2007 61% 67%
Source: Author’s calculations using Prowess database.
Table 1.10 provides a summary of bank relationships of firms across the always- and
recently-eligible groups. There is no significant difference across the two groups if we
compare the median duration of bank relationships or the median number of bankers
across the sample time period. Only 26% and 34% of firms in the always- and recently-
eligible groups, respectively, have a relationship with their bankers throughout the
sample period comprising at least 6 years. In terms of expanding the number of
bankers, 39% and 33% of always- and recently-eligible firms respectively, formed new
bank relationships after the policy change.
Duration of Bank Relationship(s). The results of the regression in Equa-
tion 1.3 with matched firm-bank sub-sample with respect to duration of firm-bank
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relationships are reported in Panel A of Table 1.11. The duration of firm-bank re-
lationships influences the magnitude of the impact of the policy change, as can be
seen from column (2) of Panel A. The always-eligible firms with longer bank rela-
tionships get crowded out to a smaller extent compared to those with shorter and
more abrupt bank relationships. This difference is about 12 percentage points. The
recently-eligible firms with longer relationships experience an increase in growth of
loans almost twice that of recently-eligible firms with shorter relationships.51 Figure
1.4 plots the coefficient estimates for bank relationship duration by buckets, and the
effect of longer relationships among both groups can be clearly seen.
Multiple Bank Relationships. In column (2) of Panel B of Table 1.11, com-
paring the coefficients on always-eligible firms indicates that firms that successfully
expanded their bank relationships experienced a smaller decrease in growth of bank
loans, compared to firms that had either fewer or unchanged number of bank relation-
ships. The difference is about 5 percentage points. The recently-eligible firms that
expanded their bankers did not seem to benefit more than those that did expand,
in fact, the recently-eligible firms that did not expand their bankers grew their bank
loans more than the those that expanded the number of bankers. This is indicative
of existing banks of recently-eligible firms extending more credit to them.
Next, I study the impact of the policy change across two important dimensions of
firms’ banks.
51 The coefficients corresponding to High and Low duration of relationship types for recently-
eligible firms are close to 30.1 and 16.4 percentage points , respectively.
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Table 1.11: Impact of the Policy Change: Bank Relationship Characteristics
Variable (∆y t,t−1) (1) (2)
Panel A: By Duration of Relationship(s)
Always Eligible × After × Long Relationship -0.247 -0.359*
(0.177) (0.214)
Always Eligible × After × Short Relationship 0.256 -0.477**
(0.194) (0.213)
Recently Eligible × After × Long Relationship 0.292** 0.301**
(0.115) (0.138)
Recently Eligible × After × Short Relationship 0.191* 0.164**
(0.114) (0.081)
Panel B: By Number of Relationship(s)
Always Eligible × After × Multiple Relationships -0.153 -0.386**
(0.219) (0.180)
Always Eligible × After × Single Relationship -0.308* -0.433**
(0.175) (0.205)
Recently Eligible × After × Multiple Relationships 0.224* 0.204**
(0.123) (0.098)
Recently Eligible × After × Single Relationship 0.177* 0.228*
(0.096) (0.118)
Number Of Observations 7,860 6,405
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change across the matched firm-bank
sample, corresponding to Equation 1.3. All other variables are as in the baseline results in Table
1.5.
Bank Directed Lending Constraints. The results of the regression in Equa-
tion 1.4 with matched firm-bank sub-sample are reported in Panel A of Table 1.12.
The coefficients on always-eligible firms with a relationship with public sector banks
Vs private sector banks reveal that while always-eligible firms were crowded out across
both bank types, the extent of crowding out among private bank relationship group
was higher by almost 20 percentage points. On the other hand, the coefficients on
recently-eligible firms across bank types reveal that firms with relationship with pub-
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lic sector banks experienced a growth rate in bank credit higher than the private bank
counterparts by almost 10 percentage points. The coefficient on never-eligible firms
relative the base category52 is statistically insignificant, which is as expected, since
never-eligible firms were not affected by this policy change.
Figure 1.4: Coefficients of the After Policy Change Indicator Across the Firm Groups.
Source: Author’s calculations from regression estimates corresponding to Equation 1.3.
52 Base category is never-eligible firms linked to public sector banks.
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Table 1.12: Impact of the Policy Change: Bank Type
Variable (∆y t,t−1) (1) (2)
Panel A: By Bank Directed Lending Shortfall
Always Eligible × After × High Shortfall Banks -0.207 -0.378*
(0.169) (0.202)
Always Eligible × After × Low Shortfall Banks -0.628* -0.445**
(0.371) (0.200)
Recently Eligible × After × High Shortfall Banks 0.209** 0.269***
(0.138) (0.103)
Recently Eligible × After × Low Shortfall Banks 0.119** 0.190*
(0.059) (0.111)
Panel B: By Bank Size
Always Eligible × After × Small Banks -0.517* -0.495**
(0.293) (0.250)
Always Eligible × After × Big Banks -0.384* -0.397**
(0.202) (0.189)
Recently Eligible × After × Small Banks 0.116 0.098*
(0.130) (0.058)
Recently Eligible × After × Big Banks 0.204** 0.232**
(0.096) (0.118)
Number Of Observations 7,860 6,405
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change across the matched firm-bank
sample, based on bank type, as in Equation 1.4. All other variables are same as in the baseline
results in Table 1.5.
Bank Size. The results of the regression in Equation 1.3 with the matched
firm-bank sample are reported in Panel B of Table 1.12. The coefficients suggest that
relationships with smaller and more local banks did not mitigate the crowding out
effect for the always-eligible firms. If anything, they experienced slower growth in
bank credit by about 10 percentage points relative to the firms associated with bigger
banks. The recently-eligible firms with small or local bankers did not benefit as much
relative to the recently-eligible firms associated with bigger banks.
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5.3 THE ROLE OF LOCAL COMPETITION
In the baseline estimation for the sample of firms matched to district-level measures
of competition, I find that the always-eligible firms experience a slow down in growth
of about 30 percentage points, while the recently-eligible firms experience growth
in bank borrowings of about 27 percentage points. The results of the regressions
corresponding to the local competition measures are presented in Table 1.13.
Local Firm Competition. In column (2) of Panel A of Table 1.13, I find
that among the always-eligible firms, those exposed to more competition tend to
experience more crowding out. The difference is about 12 percentage points. In other
words, the small(er) firms in regions with higher proportion of competing recently-
eligible small firms, tend to do relatively worse. These results are not sensitive to
the measure used for the smaller firms.53 Thus, the local competition effect can
potentially worsen access to credit for small firms, more so on the extensive margin,
especially in regions with greater competition from the larger recently-eligible firms.
Differential impact across the firm size distribution, coupled with pre-existing regional
disparities in access to credit, has the potential to worsen the region-level growth of
small businesses.54
Figure 1.5 illustrates the median-demarcated regions of high and low competition
for small firms. In districts to the right of this line, always-eligible firms are more
likely to get crowded out. Unfortunately, these districts also exhibit poorer access to
credit for always-eligible firms. For the recently-eligible firms, I do not find much of
a difference in the coefficients across districts with high and low competition, leaning
in the direction of faster growth when surrounded by fewer competitors.55 While the
53 I use the median as well as the mean of the local competition index to categorize districts into
High and Low Competition. I also calculate the competition measure by counting all the eligible
firms irrespective of previous or current access to institutional credit.
54 Regressions using an alternative local measure without accounting for pre-existing bank credit
access are reported in Table 1.27 in Appendix 1.A
55 Alternate measures of local competition produce slightly different results, but still in the direc-
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larger firms are able to achieve positive growth in loans irrespective of competition
type, the difference between the high and low competition estimates is sensitive to
the measure of competition, and should be interpreted with caution.
Table 1.13: Impact of Policy Change based on Local Competition Measures
Variable (∆y t,t−1) Coefficient
Panel A: By Local Firm Competition
Always Eligible × After × High Competition District -0.340**
(0.146)
Always Eligible × After × Low Competition District -0.228***
(0.076)
Recently Eligible × After × High Competition District 0.251*
(0.138)
Recently Eligible × After × Low Competition District 0.277**
(0.131)
Panel B: By Local Banking Constraints
Always Eligible × After × High Shortfall District -0.277**
(0.118)
Always Eligible × After × Low Shortfall District -0.434*
(0.224)
Recently Eligible × After × High Shortfall District 0.318**
(0.127)
Recently Eligible × After × Low Shortfall District 0.214**
(0.097)
Number Of Observations 5,574
Industry-Year Controls Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes
Firm Controls Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change across the competition measures
computed in Equation 1.5 and 1.6 in Section 6. All other variables are same as in the baseline results
in Table 1.5.
tion of recently-eligible firms in more competitive districts growing slower.
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Local Banking Constraints. In column (2) of Panel B of Table 1.13, I find
that the smaller firms are crowded out less in districts with more banks that are
farther away from their directed lending target at the national level. The larger
recently-eligible firms grow their credit more in directed lending deficient regions.
The presence of more priority sector deficient banks in a region may result in weaker
crowding out of smaller firms and more aggressive lending to the larger eligible firms.
This is because these banks are more constrained by the shortfall from their target,
and may not have the incentive to crowd out smaller firms. However, this measure
does not control for credit demand in the High Shortfall or Low Shortfall district.56
Figure 1.5: Distribution of Districts based on Local Competition and Credit Access.
Source: Author’s calculation using the Fourth All India Firms Census for 2006-2007.
56 These results should be interpreted with caution due to weaker identification. I am trying to
get controls for credit demand at the district level.
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6 ROBUSTNESS
I perform a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the estimates. The
results from two important checks are presented in this section.
Alternative Dependent Variables. I measure the impact on bank loans
and other borrowings using alternative measures and repeat all the regressions using
Equation 1.1. In Table 1.14, I present the estimates using scaled change in bank loans
∆Yt /Assets t−1 as the dependent variable. The difference-in-differences estimates57 are
statistically significant, and in the same direction as the estimates presented in Section
7. I also use alternative measures such as the scaled level of bank loans Yt /Assets t−1
, and find similar results. The results are presented in Appendix 1.B.
Table 1.14: Impact of Policy Change on Scaled Change in Bank Borrowings
Variable (∆Yt/Assetst−1) (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After 0.0002 -0.339** -0.272*
(0.082) (0.161) (0.140)
Recently Eligible × After 0.112* 0.022 0.146**
(0.057) (0.103) (0.074)
Number Of Observations 8,874 8,874 8,504
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Group-level Time Trends No Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates corresponding to Equation 1.1. All variable are the same as those
in Table 1.5.
Alternative Industry-Year Controls. To rule out the concern of the results
being partially driven by measurement error industry-level aggregates, I use both the
level output and growth series as controls for industry trends across time. I also use
industry-year fixed effects. These results are similar in magnitude and sign, with a
57 The coefficient estimate corresponding to the difference-in-differences variable.
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positive difference-in-differences coefficient for recently-eligible firms and a negative
coefficient for always-eligible firms, as presented in Table 1.15. I repeat this estimation
using terciles of the recently-eligible group and find that the lower tercile RE1 grows
faster than RE3, in a relative sense.
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Table 1.15: Impact on Growth of Bank Borrowings using Industry-Year Effects
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After -0.041 -0.182* -0.262**
(0.067) (0.109) (0.133)
Recently Eligible × After 0.084** 0.190*** 0.207**
(0.042) (0.072) (0.088)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Group-level Time Trends No Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates corresponding to Equation 1.1. All variable are the same as those
in Table 1.5.
False Cut-Off Test. Since recently-eligible firms are bigger than always-
eligible firms in size by definition, the captured effect may simply be driven by firm
size, i.e., the bigger firms grow their bank credit faster during this sample period. To
check for this, I construct alternate control and treatment groups based on firm size.
In Table 1.16, I present a case where I use medium and large firms as the control and
treated groups, respectively, and conduct the same differential impact analysis.59 I do
not find notable evidence of crowding-out of medium firms relative to large firms. I
estimate similar checks using an alternate dependent variable and using industry-year
fixed effects, discussed in Appendix 1.B.
58 Unlike Bhue et al. (2016), the magnitude of the difference-in-differences estimate is only 1
percentage point. The results are presented in Appendix 1.B.
59 This exercise is which is akin to running a placebo experiment. Other constructions of arbitrary
control and treatment groups available upon request.
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Table 1.16: Impact on Growth of Bank Borrowings using a False Cut-off
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Large Firms × After -0.127** -0.170* -0.119
(0.053) (0.095) (0.122)
Large Firms × t 0.014 -0.058
(0.025) (0.030)
Number Of Observations 7,405 7,405 6,033
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The
indicator LAi equals 1 if the firm is characterized as large (> 100 INR Mln in plant and machinery)
in 2006-2007. The reference group is medium firms group (> 50 and < 100 INR Mln in plant and
machinery). The other details are same as those in Table 1.5.
Survivor Bias and Sample Selection. Less than 5% of the firms in the data
exit due to unknown reasons. Since the Prowess database does not report entry and
exit of firms, I refrain from analyzing the same. In other words, I can not attribute
the exit of firms from my sample to a formal shut-down or closure. The survey data
on small firms from the Fourth All India MSMED Census reports 7% of closures
due to access of finance. The final sample of firms only comprises those firms whose
financial variables are available from 2004-2010, or only those firms that survived the
entire period. Its fair to interpret the results as the effect of the policy change on
the most stable firms. Moreover, the sample of always-eligible small firms in the data
used in this study are not representative of the universe of small firms in India, with
more firms entering in the higher-end of the firm size distribution . This selection
disproportionately includes firms that report their audited accounts. However, to the
extent that firms following strict bookkeeping rules and the bigger than average firms
are over-represented, they are less likely to be negatively affected than their excluded
counterparts.
Evaluating the impact of directed lending programs is challenging. Even if it can
be established that the program eligibility is causal in terms of improved credit access
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for firms, it is hard to determine if and how the program affects firm growth, in the
medium and the long term. Moreover, such programs impose other costs too. Lend-
ing mandates lead to cross-subsidization within banks, with non-priority borrowers
partially paying the costs through higher interest rates. Banks may experience lower
returns on their priority sector lending, or experience increasing burden of accumu-
lating non-performing assets among the priority sectors. This study abstracts from
the analysis of these general equilibrium effects mainly owing to data limitations.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study finds evidence of undesired distributive effects of size-based credit pro-
grams. I exploit a discontinuity in program eligibility to study the differential impact
of a nation-wide directed lending program across the firm-size distribution. I find
that the benefits of the policy intervention flow disproportionately to the larger firms.
Newly included firms that gain eligibility experience an increase in the rate of growth
of institutional credit, as well as higher investment and sales growth. On the other
hand, the smaller always-eligible firms are crowded out in the bank credit market.
The newly-eligible firms also experience increased investment and sales growth after
the policy change, while there is no evidence of any improvement in the real outcomes
for the always-eligible small firms. Since banks are subject to a directed lending quota,
they prefer to lend to larger firms as economies of scale decrease transaction costs.
This paper further analyzes the impact of the directed lending program on small
firm credit access across two dimensions : the role of bank relationships, and the role
of competition in the local bank credit market. Using firm-bank matched data, I
find that small firms with longer and multiple bank relationships suffer less. Firms
that borrow from banks farther away from the mandated quota also experience less
crowding out. Surprisingly, long-term relationships with small and local banks do
not mitigate the crowding out. Using district-level measures of firm competition, I
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find that smaller firms indeed get crowded out more in districts with more intense
competition from larger firms, and vice-versa. Over time, such effects risk worsening
existing regional disparities in access to institutional credit of small firms across the
country.
This study points to an important side effect of a well-intentioned policy interven-
tion aimed at increasing credit access of all small firms, and simultaneously providing
banks with more lending avenues to achieve their directed lending targets. By virtue
of its design, however, it distorts the lending incentives of banks, allowing them to
exploit the policy shift as an opportunity to lower transaction costs. This suggests
that in a setting with lending quotas, if institutional lenders are unable to satisfac-
torily lower transaction and information costs, they will choose to make loans to the
largest eligible borrowers whenever possible. Future policy design must be guided by
research that assesses the overall impact of existing programs, in order to develop






Firm-level Variables. These definitions have been taken from the Prowess database
dictionary and correspond to the firm-level variables used in Section 4.
1. Total sales is the sum of sales and income from non-financial services.
2. Total assets refer to sum of all current and non-current assets held by a com-
pany as on the last day of an accounting period.
3. Gross fixed assets refer to the aggregate un-depreciated value of all of a
company’s gross fixed assets as on the last day of an accounting period. It is
essentially the sum of the costs of construction or acquisition. It also takes into
account capitalized expenses. If a fixed asset is sold at any point in time, the
historical cost thereof is deducted from the value of the gross fixed assets.
4. Gross plant and machinery is the total un-depreciated value of the installed
plant and machinery as at the end of the accounting period. These are essen-
tially production facilities for manufacturing goods.
5. EBITDA refers to earnings or profits before depreciation, interest, tax and
amortization. These are called PBDITA in the database.
6. Current ratio is a liquidity ratio that measures a company’s ability to meet its
short term obligations, i.e., to pay off its short term liabilities, typically within
one year. A ratio below one implies inadequacy and a ratio just above one
would indicate a “just-about” adequate ability to meet current liabilities. But,
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a ratio that is much above one would indicate too much of short term asset on
hand that could possibly be deployed for better long-term use.
7. Quick ratio is the ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities. It measures the
ability of a company to pay its immediate or short term liabilities by using its
cash and near cash current assets. It is a more stringent measure of short term
liquidity as compared to the current ratio. Quick assets differ from current
assets mainly in that they exclude inventory.
8. Total liabilities are the sum of all the resources deployed. They include all
sums owed to the shareholders in the form of share capital and reserves &
surpluses, all sums owed to lenders in the form of secured and unsecured loans
and all current liabilities and provisions. It also includes deferred tax liability.
9. Total borrowings includes all forms of debt, interest bearing or otherwise,
secured and unsecured, short-term or long-term, and any other financial debt
issued by financial institutions, government, the RBI, syndicated loans, etc.
10. Total bank borrowings are the aggregate borrowings from banking institu-
tions, whether obtained from a single bank or a syndicate. All types of loans
in the form of short-term loans, long term loans, cash credits, bank overdrafts,
etc. are treated at par and are combined under this category bank borrowing.
11. Total forex earnings is the sum total of the earnings of a company in terms
of foreign exchange, including earnings from export of goods, export of services,
forex earning dividend, forex earning interest, and deemed export sales.
12. Export earnings is the total Free-On-Board (F.O.B.) value of the goods ex-
ported by a company, as disclosed in the notes to accounts in the balance sheet.
These include export of goods calculated on F.O.B basis, royalty, know-how,
professional and consultation fees, interest and dividends, and other income.
13. Export sales ratio measures the export earnings from goods and services as
a percentage of sales. This ratio is a measure of the degree of exposure of a
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company to exports markets, i.e., how much business a company generates by
catering to export markets.
Industry Aggregates and Deflators. The Wholesale Price Index (WPI)
is used to deflate the level variables. The data are obtained from the Ministry of
Commerce Industry website, which is responsible for compilation of price data and
release of All-Commodities WPI series and Industry-wise WPI series. The borrow-
ings variables are deflated by the all-commodities WPI, and the firms’ level variables
such as sales, assets, and profits, as well as the national level industry-wise output
are deflated by the industry-specific WPI series. I map the firm two-digit industry
code to the industry codes for which the WPI series are available.
Industry Output Series. The national-level industry output and growth se-
ries are taken from the Annual Survey of Industries’ Historical Time Series collected
by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. These series span years
2003-2009. Since the National Industrial Classification (NIC) were changed twice in
the span of those years60, I map the code books across the years to obtain a common
series that corresponds to the NIC 2008 series. Each firm in the sample is mapped to
one of the following industries:
1. Crop and animal production, hunting and related
2. Forestry and logging
3. Fishing and aquaculture
4. Mining of coal and lignite
5. Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
6. Mining of metal ores
60 NIC 1998 was updated to NIC 2004, and NIC 2004 was updated to NIC 2008.
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7. Other mining and quarrying
8. Mining support service activities
9. Manufacture of food products
10. Manufacture of beverages
11. Manufacture of tobacco products
12. Manufacture of textiles
13. Manufacture of wearing apparel
14. Manufacture of leather and related products
15. Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork
16. Manufacture of paper and paper products
17. Manufacture of printing and reproduction of recorded media
18. Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
19. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
20. Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
21. Manufacture of rubber and plastics products
22. Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
23. Manufacture of basic metals
24. Manufacture of fabricated metal products
25. Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
26. Manufacture of electrical equipment
27. Manufacture of machinery and equipment
28. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
29. Manufacture of other transport equipment
30. Manufacture of manufacture of furniture
31. Other manufacturing
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1.B FIGURES AND TABLES
Differences in Time Trends. To check for differences in trends across the three
groups of firms (Always Eligible, Recently Eligible, Never Eligible), I run a regres-
sion of bank borrowings and firm sales, separately, and plot the sum of residuals
corresponding to each group.
yist = β0 + β1×IOst + β2×∆IOst + εist
In the regressions, I control for industry-specific business cycles using the aggre-
gate industry output IOst and growth rate of industry output ∆IOst. I find evidence
of differences in time trend for both groups in their borrowings as well as sales growth.
These differences are evident from the time plot of the sum of group-wise residuals,
as can be seen in Figures 1.4 and 1.5. Since there is a difference in the trend across
the small firms and large firm group, I control for group-wise time trends in all the
regressions in my empirical analysis.
Trends for Never-Eligible Firms. In Figure 1.6, I plot the deflated sum of
total bank borrowings and total sales for the never-eligible firms.
Summary Statistics for All Firms. In Section 3 which discusses the data,
I explain why I exclude exporters from this analysis due to their special access to
export credit programs during the time frame of this study. Here, I report descriptive
statistics for all firms in this period, including the exporting firms, in Table 1.17.
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Figure 1.6: Group-wise Summed-up Residuals from the Bank Borrowings Regression.
Source: Author’s calculations based on firm-level data from the Prowess database.
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Figure 1.7: Group-wise Summed-up Residuals from the Total Sales Regression.
Source: Author’s calculations based on firm-level data from the Prowess database.
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Figure 1.8: Sum of Total Bank Borrowings and Total Sales for the Never-Eligible Firms.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.18: Impact of Policy Change on Scaled Change in Bank Borrowings
Variable (∆Yt/Assetst−1) (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After 0.0001 -0.227** -0.272**
(0.082) (0.110) (0.114)
Recently Eligible (1st Tercile) × After 0.181*** 0.218 0.225
(0.063) (0.187) (0.189)
Recently Eligible (2nd Tercile) × After 0.029 0.083 0.082
(0.072) (0.077) (0.084)
Recently Eligible (3rd Tercile) × After 0.136** 0.121* 0.178**
(0.066) (0.074) (0.076)
Number Of Observations 8,874 8,874 8,504
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The REi is split into terciles. All other variables are same as in the baseline results in Table 1.5.
Table 1.19: Impact of Policy Change on Level of Bank Loans Scaled by Assets
Variable (Yt/Assetst−1) (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After 0.077 0.0004 -0.017
(0.099) (0.060) (0.021)
Recently Eligible × After 0.108 0.101** 0.041**
(0.091) (0.044) (0.019)
Always Eligible × t 0.031 0.006
(0.022) (0.007)
Recently Eligible × t 0.003 -0.011
(0.023) (0.009)
Number Of Observations 9,192 9,192 8,820
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The dependent variable is bank borrowings scaled by assets, corresponding to Equation 1.1. The
other details are same as those in Table 1.5.
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Table 1.20: Impact of Policy Change on Growth of Firm Investment and Sales
using Industry-Year Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆salest,t−1
Always Eligible × After 0.009 -0.059
(0.017) (0.048)












Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates corresponding to Equation 1.3 and 1.4, using industry-year fixed
effects. The other details are same as those in Table 1.8.
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Table 1.21: Impact of Policy Change on Share of Bank Loans in Total Loans
Bank Borrowings/Total Borrowings (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After -0.059*** -0.009 -0.025
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019)
Recently Eligible × After -0.035*** -0.043*** 0.032**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Always Eligible × t -0.017** -0.009
(0.007) (0.008)
Recently Eligible × t -0.026*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.006)
Number Of Observations 11,086 11,086 8,816
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on the share of bank borrowings
corresponding to Equation 1.1. All variables are same as in Table 1.5.
Table 1.22: Impact of Policy Change using Industry-Year Fixed Effects
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Always Eligible × After -0.041 -0.181** -0.263**
(0.067) (0.108) (0.133)
Recently Eligible (1st Tercile) × After 0.176** 0.287** 0.106
(0.069) (0.116) (0.152)
Recently Eligible (2nd Tercile) × After 0.040 0.203* 0.273**
(0.060) (0.108) (0.132)
Recently Eligible (3rd Tercile) × After 0.051 0.098 0.229**
(0.064) (0.109) (0.114)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Group-level Time Trends No Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change across firm groups and sub-groups
of REi firms, corresponding to Equation 1.2. All other variables are same as in Table 1.5.
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Table 1.23: Impact of Policy Change using Industry-Year Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆salest
(terciles) (median) (terciles) (median)
Always Eligible × After 0.009 0.009 -0.059 -0.059
(0.018) (0.017) (0.048) (0.048)
Recently Eligible (1st Tercile) × After 0.044** 0.036
(0.020) (0.042)
Recently Eligible (2nd Tercile) × After 0.0008 0.042
(0.019) (0.042)
Recently Eligible (3rd Tercile) × After 0.034* 0.063
(0.018) (0.046)
Recently Eligible (< Median) × After 0.031* 0.045
(0.016) (0.036)
Recently Eligible (> Median) × After 0.022 0.049
(0.016) (0.037)
Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423 9,423 9,423
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on real outcomes using industry-
year fixed effects, as in Equation 1.3 and 1.4. The dependent variables are the investment-to-capital
ratio and total sales growth. The REi is split into terciles or by the median. All other variables are
same as in Table 1.8.
61
Table 1.24: False Cut-off: Impact of Policy Change using Industry-Year Effects
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Large Firms × After -0.133** -0.137 -0.111
(0.055) (0.097) (0.124)
Large Firms × t 0.001 0.008
(0.025) (0.041)
Number Of Observations 7,405 7,405 6,033
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the false cut-off test using alternate industry-year controls. The
indicator LAi equals 1 if the firm is characterized as large (> 100 INR Mln in plant and machinery)
in 2005-2006. The reference category are medium-sized firms. All other variables are same as in
Table 1.5.
Table 1.25: False Cut-off: Impact of Policy Change on Scaled Change in Bank
Loans
Variable (∆Yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
Large Firms × After -0.107 0.036 -0.077
(0.094) (0.125) (0.088)
Large Firms × t -0.058 0.023
(0.068) (0.030)
Number Of Observations 6,259 6,259 6,038
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the false cut-off test using medium and large firms as control
and treated groups, respectively, and using industry-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
change in log of bank borrowings. The indicator LAi equals 1 if the firm is characterized as large
(> 100 INR Mln in plant and machinery) in 2005-2006.
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Table 1.26: External-finance based Composition of Registered Small Firms in
2006-2007
Source(s) of External Finance
Firm Size (i) None (ii) Only formal (iii) Only informal (iv) Both Total
All Small Firms 46,152 12,288 1,034 2,172 61,648
(75%) (20%) (2%) (3%)
Always Eligible 37,859 9,767 800 1,496 49,923
(81%) (76%) (20%) (2%) (3%)
Recently Eligible 8,293 2,521 234 676 11,725
(19%) (71%) (21%) (2%) (6%)
Notes: This table displays the composition and sources of credit as reported by small firms in the
All India Fourth Annual Census. Small firms are assigned Always Eligible or Recently Eligible status
based on the value of reported gross plant & machinery. Formal sources of credit comprise commercial
and co-operative banks, development financial institutions and any government-run credit support
programs.
Table 1.27: Impact of Policy Change based on Local Competition Measures
Variable (∆y t,t−1) (1) (2)
Always Eligible × After × High Competition District -0.325** -0.314**
(0.133) (0.124)
Always Eligible × After × Low Competition District -0.271** -0.275**
(0.118) (0.121)
Recently Eligible × After × High Competition District 0.221* 0.262*
(0.132) (0.138)
Recently Eligible × After × Low Competition District 0.301** 0.266*
(0.103) (0.137)
Number Of Observations 5,574 5,574
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change across the competition measures




THE IMPACT OF CREDIT SUBSIDIES ON THE EXPORT
PERFORMANCE OF INDIAN FIRMS
In recent years, trade policy in developing countries has focused on trade facilitation
and export promotion. A variety of targeted government-funded programs have been
employed by policymakers to stimulate firm exports (Lederman et al. (2010)). The
justification of government intervention in export markets is mostly based on the
theory of asymmetric information and other market failures which are more intensified
for exporting firms (Feenstra et al. (2014)). Such policies target multiple dimensions
of exporting activity, namely, raising exports of existing exporters, improving survival
probability of the hardest hit export industries, and assisting exporters to diversify
the export basket as well as the export destinations. Export support schemes vary
in their intent, from providing direct production or export assistance in facilitating
access to new destinations, to assistance in marketing export products to new foreign
markets, upgrading infrastructure and technology, and reducing other trade barriers
such as administrative expenses. State-funded loan guarantees, export insurance and
export credit subsidies are other commonly employed policy tools.1
The Government of India formulated the Interest Rate Subsidy Scheme in 2007,
to reduce the cost of short-term credit for exporters in employment-intensive sectors,
given their important contribution in the GDP.2 Short-term loans of exporters are
1 A detailed summary is provided in Van Biesebroeck et al. (2016) listing all studies using firm-
level evidence on export promotion by country. A close to exhaustive list of 21 studies covering
16 countries is provided for studies conducted in the last decade.
2 The contribution of exported goods in the GDP was about 12.26% and 13.71% in 2005 and
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mainly working capital loans in the form of pre-shipment and post-shipment export
credit. Between 2007 and 2013, the government announced subsidies on short-term
bank loans on a semi-annual or annual basis. SMEs across all product lines, and
large firms across specific product lines or sectors were eligible for subsidized export
credit. While minimizing short-term credit frictions of SMEs and labor-intensive firms
was the immediate goal of the policy in the wake of the global recession, the long-
term goal of the program was to provide Indian exporters credit at internationally
competitive rates.3 The Federation of Indian Export Organization felt these credit
support measures were insufficient to make Indian manufacturing exports competitive,
and that in the absence of appropriate government support, the decline in expected
exports could cost close to 1.5 million jobs in the export sector.4 According to the
Interim Budget Report of 2009-2010, the interest subsidy on pre- and post-shipment
credit for employment oriented sectors and SMEs from March until September 2009
would involve a financial expense of USD 100 Million. Since subsidy support schemes
pose a significant financial burden to the government budget each year, it is important
to uncover which factors determine the success of these credit market interventions,
both in terms of improvement in export volumes and employment generation.
In this paper, I study the impact of this export credit intervention on the export
performance of subsidized firms at the intensive and extensive margin of exports, as
well as on the export participation decision.5 I exploit the variation in eligibility to
the subsidy at the firm-level due to the staggered nature of the program targeting a
different set of firms based on product lines across the time period 2007-2013. Since
this program did not involve a randomized choice of beneficiaries, subsidized firms
2010, respectively, according to UNCTAD country profiles. See Figure 2.1 in Appendix 2.C for
the share of select industries in total exports.
3 To my knowledge, no other explicit reasoning was provided regarding the choice of labor-
intensive sectors, for the provision of these export credit subsidies.
4 According to G.K. Pillai, the Commerce Secretary, there was an anticipated loss of 1.5 million
jobs in the export sector during 2008-2009 due to a USD 15 Billion decline in expected exports.
5 Due to data restrictions, it is not possible to study the impact of the subsidies on employment.
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are likely to be different from non-subsidized firms. I control for firm-level and sector-
level differences, as well as for demand-side shocks to estimate the effect of the policy
on subsidized firms. For this empirical analysis, I construct a detailed data set which
matches the balance-sheet data on medium and large exporting firms in the Indian
manufacturing sector from 2006-2013, with information on the firm-bank relation-
ships, with the year-wise eligibility status at the product-level. I compute a firm-level
measure of demand shock using the past product-level import dependence on des-
tination countries, which is likely highly correlated with firm-level export growth.
There are two main findings of this paper. First, I find that the impact of subsidies
is estimated at between 5-8% in a difference-in-differences sense, compared to non-
subsidized exporters.6 The subsidies are not effective in the event of a substantial
drop in world demand, as that experienced during the year after the global financial
recession, suggesting the limited usefulness of credit support as a policy tool during
a major global downturn. Second, the impact of credit subsidies is higher for firms
already enjoying above average fiscal benefits, implying a complementary effect of
pre-existing export benefits. Larger and more productive firms benefit to a lesser ex-
tent than their counterparts, implying that firms with more intense credit constraints
benefit relatively more. Firms’ financial health indicators such as liquidity and lever-
age do not have a differential effect on subsidized firms. Also, subsidized firms with
stronger bank relationships benefit relatively more. Finally, I do not find any impact
on export participation of firms. This is not unexpected given the short-term and
unanticipated nature of the subsidy scheme.
6 Van Biesebroeck et al. (2016) find that in Peru and Belgium, the impact of export promotion
was about 20%. Görg et al. (2008) find that only large enough export grants can lead to about
5% expansion in exports. Martincus and Carballo (2010) find that export promotion activities
have a positive effect on the extensive margin of firms’ exports but they do not have any robust
impact on the intensive margin in the cases of Peru and Costa Rica. Cansino et al. (2013) find
that a trade promotion program in Spain led to improving export intensity by 10%.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview
of the related literature. Section 2 provides the details of export-credit financing policy
in India. Section 3 describes the data sources used in the study and the methodology
to map the various data sets used in this study. Section 4 describes the empirical
strategy and the results. Section 5 discusses robustness checks and important caveats.
Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications of the findings.
1 RELATED LITERATURE
There are three key findings in the literature evaluating the effectiveness of export
promotion policies. First, export promotion has proved to be more successful for
existing exporters. Girma et al. (2009) find that conditional on firm characteristics,
production subsidies stimulate export activities of existing Chinese exporters but have
not been very helpful for firms trying to enter the export market. Görg et al. (2008)
find that export grants help existing Irish exporting firms to compete more effectively
on the international market but do not find similar evidence for non-exporters to
start exporting. Helmers et al. (2010) find that export subsidies in Colombia pos-
itively impacted export volumes and the impact is diminishing in subsidy size and
in the degree of a firm’s connectedness to the government. A plausible explanation
for these results in the literature is the persistent nature of key firm-level character-
istics such as productivity, profitability, external finance dependence, and possibly
political economy aspects, which are difficult to affect with temporary export sup-
port programs (Manova (2012), Chaney (2016), Melitz (2003)). Second, most studies
find evidence supporting the presence of a stronger impact of export programs with
respect to entry into new markets vis-a-vis improving export volumes among estab-
lished exporters. Using highly disaggregated export data for Chilean exporters over
2002-2006, Martincus and Carballo (2010) find that export promotion activities have
heterogeneous effects over the distribution of export performance along both the ex-
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tensive and intensive margins. Stronger effects are observed on the lower end of the
distribution of export volumes and the lower and upper ends of the distributions of
the number of destination countries and products. Defever et al. (2017) study the
Cash Incentive Scheme for Exports program provided by the Government of Nepal,
which is granted primarily to large exporters. They find a small positive effect on
the number of eligible products exported and on the number of destination mar-
kets reached. Third, evaluating the export programs with respect to the medium-
to long-term in addition to the short-term reveals that their impact is short-lived
and heterogeneous across firms. Cadot et al. (2015) study beneficiaries of matching
grants for export business-plan making in Tunisia and find that the positive impact
on export volumes and improved diversification across destinations and products per-
sisted only for three years. Van Biesebroeck et al. (2015) study the causal impact of
the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service on export volume on Canadian exporters.
They find that while Canadian firms which received assistance from Canada’s Trade
Commissioner Services at any time in the past exported significantly more than the
control group, the impact declines in subsequent years if firms do not receive support
anymore.
In this paper, I contribute to the existing literature by studying the firm-level
impact of a recent export credit subsidy program in India from 2007-2013, with a focus
on the intensive margin of exports of medium and large exporters. I also analyze the
effect of firm-bank relationships with respect to duration of relationship and access
to multiple bankers. To my knowledge, Kapoor et al. (2017) is the only other study
analyzing the impact of a credit program subsidizing Indian exporters in the small
sector. Exploiting a natural experiment provided by two policy changes, first, in
1998, which made small-scale firms eligible for directed credit, and then, a subsequent
reversal in policy in 2000, the authors find evidence of an increase in bank credit
growth, and a 22% increase in export earnings. They find no subsequent drop in
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export earnings following the reversal of the policy suggesting the temporary program
helped form lasting firm-bank relationships.
While the role of credit in determining export performance of firms has been
at the core of the trade-finance literature, numerous studies have also linked the
recent trade collapse to demand-side shocks (Behrens et al. (2013), Eaton et al.
(2016), Levchenko et al. (2010), Chakraborty (2018)), rather than to only supply-
side constraints (Bricongne et al. (2012), Chor and Manova (2012), Paravisini et al.
(2014)). In this analysis, I account for shocks to demand for exports by controlling
for GDP growth in importing countries. There is also evidence of a negative impact
on exporters from worsening health of the financial institutions supporting exporters.
Amiti and Weinstein (2011) establish a causal link between shocks in the financial
sector to exporters that result in exports declining faster than domestic output during
banking crises. Since the banking sector in India had very limited exposure to the
global banking sector, I do not expect to find a link between banker health and firm
performance. I capture differential effects in the performance of firms which enjoyed
access to foreign capital markets, to the extent that access to capital markets abroad
are a signal of a certain degree of foreign credit dependence.
2 EXPORT CREDIT POLICY IN INDIA
The Export Financing Scheme was first introduced by the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) in 1967 to make short-term credit accessible to exporters at internationally
comparable interest rates, which in turn would help them price export products more
competitively for the international market. There are two main types of short-term
export credit extended by banks, namely, pre-shipment and post-shipment credit.7
Pre-shipment credit is a short-term loan or advance or any other credit provided
by a bank to an exporter for financing the purchase, processing, manufacturing or
7 Definitions are available in RBI documentation available at Master Circular RBI/2012-13/74.
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packing of goods prior to shipment, on the basis of letter of credit opened in favor
of the exporter by an overseas buyer or a confirmed order of export of goods from
an overseas buyer. Post-shipment credit is a short-term loan provided to an exporter
to manage the working capital cycle gap until the realization of export proceeds and
includes any loan or any advance granted to an exporter, in consideration of the
security of any duty drawback allowed by the Government from time to time.
Interest Rate Regimes. Interest rates on export loans have historically been
regulated by the RBI. From 2003-2010, the interest rate on exports-related loans
was determined based on the Benchmark Prime Lending Rate (BPLR). Under the
Export Financing Scheme until 2010, rupee export credit interest rates were capped
at the banks’ Benchmark Prime Lending Rate, set by banks at a quarterly frequency.8
Starting July 1, 2010, banks were advised to switch over to the system of Base Rate.
Under the BPLR regime, the RBI fixed only the ceiling rate of interest for export
credit while banks were free to decide the rates of interest within the ceiling rates
keeping in view the BPLR, the spread guidelines, credit history of the borrowers,
and the borrower-risk perception. Starting July 1, 2010, the BPLR was replaced by
the Base Rate, and consequently interest rate on rupee export credit was determined
by using the base rate as a price floor. While large exporters were unaffected by
switching interest rate regimes, small exporters that may have previously been credit
rationed, were benefited under the Base Rate regime.9
Export Credit Interest Rate Subsidy Scheme. The scheme was originally
referred to as Export Credit Interest Rate Subvention Scheme. The Government of
India formulated the scheme in 2007 to reduce the cost of short-term credit for export-
oriented employment-intensive sectors. An interest rate subsidy was applied to both
8 Foreign currency export loans are also available at a cheaper cost, but were instead linked to
the LIBOR rate.
9 To my knowledge, there is no study that examines the presence of a differential impact of the
interest rate regime shift. There is only anecdotal evidence suggesting the relative differential
impact across different firm sizes.
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pre-shipment (packing credit) and post-shipment credit. From 2007 to 2013, subsidies
on short-term bank loans for exporters were announced. The rate of the subsidy
was 2% for all years until the last scheme in 2013 when it was raised to 3%. The
announcement of eligible exporters was mostly made on a year-to-year basis and on
some occasions on a semi-annual basis which was later extended until the end of
the year. Once announced, banks were required to pass on the full extent of the
subsidy to eligible exporters, but they had operation flexibility in terms of deciding
the duration of the short-term loan, the repayment cycle, and also in demanding
complete documentation of export transactions from exporters. While SMEs across
all product lines were eligible, large firms were eligible for subsidized export credit
only across specific product lines. The eligible product lines were either pinned down
at the four- or three- or two-digit (product-level) HS codes. Various industry groups
believe that such subsidies were in line with WTO norms, and that competitors such
as China, Bangladesh and Vietnam, are able to provide much lower interest rates on
export credit.10
Selection of Eligible Exporters. The goal of the subsidies was to minimize
short-term credit frictions for SMEs and export-oriented labor-intensive sectors in
order to promote exports. While this line of reasoning is intuitive for small firms which
are typically credit constrained, it is less clear why large exporters were subsidized.
The announcements made by the RBI include information on explicit targeting of
labor-intensive sectors in order to boost exports and protect the huge number of
workers in these sectors. To my knowledge, no study investigates if the eligible labor-
intensive sectors experienced either improved sales or worker retention. In fact, there
10 An article in The Hindu quoted Himanshu Tewari, Partner, BMR Associates LLP: “Though
such interest subvention schemes are considered to be an element of export credit, they do not
strictly fall in the definition of direct export subsidy within the WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing measures.” Also, they quoted A Sakthivel, Chairman of Federation of Indian
Export Organisation:“Interest in China is 6.25 per cent and in Bangladesh it is 6.75 per cent.
These rates are still lower than that offered to exporters, even after the 3 per cent subvention.”
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is little evidence even to show that the selected labor-intensive sectors contributed
heavily to employment growth for the sample period. A study commissioned by the
Indian Council for Research on International Economics Relation, Das et al. (2009)
identifies export-oriented labor-intensive sectors and does not find conclusive evidence
on the link between credit-constraints, export performance and employment potential.
The export-oriented labor-intensive sectors identified for the study include leather
goods, apparel goods, gems and jewelry, sports goods and metals. These sectors
overlap with a majority of the sectors and product lines that were eligible under
the subsidy scheme from 2007-2013.11 After being discontinued in the financial year
2014-2015, the policy was replaced by the Interest Equalisation Scheme for 5 years for
416 specified tariff lines, and across all lines for exports of Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises.12. The sample period of study in this paper is limited to the years of the
first policy, which was announced in a staggered manner from 2007-2013.13
3 DATA
Firm-level data. I use annual firm-level balance sheet data from the Prowess
database to evaluate the impact of the Export Subsidy Scheme from 2007-2013.14
The database accounts for more than 70% of the economic activity in the organized
industrial sector, 75% of corporate taxes and 95% of excise duty collected by the
Indian Government (Goldberg et al. (2010)). The database provides firm variables
such as industry code, product code,15 ownership details, total sales, total assets,
value of goods exported, total capital, borrowings, and variables indicating financial
11 A detailed list of eligible product lines from 2007 to 2013 is available in the Appendix 2.B.
12 The announcement is available on the RBI website: Interest Equalisation Scheme on Pre and
Post Shipment Rupee Export Credit
13 To investigate the impact of the more recent export credit program currently in place will require
more recent data which is likely to be available by 2019.
14 The data availability at the quarterly level for export details is poor.
15 The database categorizes firms according to the four-digit NIC codes. There are total of 1,886
products linked to 108 four-digit NIC industry codes across the 22 manufacturing sectors span-
ning the industrial composition of the Indian economy.
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health. The definitions of variables used in this study are presented in Appendix 2.A.
According to estimates in Chakraborty (2018), the average industry exports summed
over all firms in a manufacturing industry in Prowess explains around 36% of exports
from the same industry category of trade data, and the ratio varies from 18% (leather)
to as high as 60% (beverages) across two-digit NIC industries.
To identify subsidized firms each year, I map the Prowess detailed National Indus-
trial Classification (NIC) industry-level codes to the Indian Trade Clarification based
on Harmonized System of Coding (ITC-HS) four-digit product-level codes. This map-
ping is typically required in any study in this literature studying Indian trade data,
however, to my knowledge, it has never been made publicly available for researchers
from an institutional source.16 The database also provides the list of banker(s) of
firms for each year.17 I use this firm-bank matching to characterize each firm’s bank
relationship and bank type based on the bank relationship duration and the associated
banks’ count and ownership.18
Trade Flows. I use trade data provided by UN Comtrade to compute exports
of India at the two-digit HS code level. Trade data are also available in the DataBank
series of the World Bank. These data are used to construct a demand shock emanating
from slowing growth in importer countries as well as to understand how the economies
in select importer countries grew during the sample period. In Figure 2.1, I plot the
trend of export and GDP growth for the world, India, China and USA. The GDP as
well as export growth of India and China move in sync during this period. The only
year with negative GDP and export growth rate is the year 2009.
16 Since this manual mapping is tedious and can be prone to judgments, I map the subset of
eligible HS four-digit product codes to NIC four-digit codes in the data, and map only the HS
two-digit product codes to NIC four-digit codes for the full sample of firms.
17 Data available for a slightly smaller sample than the full sample.
18 For firms that report more than one bank per firm-year, the duration is based on the median
duration among the matched firm-bank pairs, that occurred in adjacent years. For the number
of bankers measure, I count the median number of bankers of firms across the sample period.
For the bank ownership measure, I compute the median of the proportion of state-owned banks.
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Figure 2.1: Trend in Growth of Exports and GDP from 2006-2013 in Select Countries.
Source: Author’s calculations using country-wise series from World Bank’s DataBank.
Industry-level Deflators I use industry-level deflators and the wholesale price
index to deflate the firm-level data. Data on industry aggregates are taken from
the Historical Time Series collected by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation. I use the WPI series to deflate nominal variables.19 Industry-level
deflators are also used in the calculation of firm productivity.
Sample Period. The sample period for the study is 2006-2013. The reference
year is 2006, i.e., the year preceding the year the subsidies were first introduced.
Data Exclusions. I restrict my analysis to medium and large firms. Data on
19 Bank loans and debt data are deflated by the All-Commodities WPI, firm-level variables such as
assets, profits, and industry-level aggregates are deflated by the corresponding industry-specific
WPI.
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the gross value of plant and machinery is used to demarcate firm size, according to
the official definition.20 Since this policy is announced three to six months in advance
and only for a period of six to twelve months, I focus on the short-term impact on
pre-existing exporting firms, and exclude firms that did not export in the reference
year. I exclude firms which do not use any bank credit, as the policy works via a
subsidy on the interest rate on short-term bank export credit. Due to this exclusion,
I drop close to 6% of the exporting firms in my sample. In addition, I drop some
unreasonable observations with negative values for some key variables, such as total
assets, total debt, total sales, total export, and gross fixed assets.
Summary Statistics. In Table 2.1, I present the summary statistics of the
sample of manufacturing firms in this paper for the financial years 2007-2008, i.e.,
the first year of the subsidy scheme. I report the statistics in three groups - all firms,
only exporting firms and subsidized exporting firms. From Table 2.1, we can see that
about 26% of the firms were exporters in 2007.21 In the first year of the subsidy
scheme, about 65% of exporters in my sample were eligible.22 Exporting firms in the
data have above average sales and assets. Exporters are relatively more dependent
on bank loans, and among them the subsidized set of firms, more so. While exporters
are more productive and more profitable firms, the subsidized firms are marginally
less profitable as reflected in their EBITDA ratio. All firms across categories do
not appear to differ on average in terms of their short-term liquidity or debt-ratio.
Subsidized exporters exhibit higher export intensity than non-subsidized exporters,
but this trend is not stable across years.
20 Small and micro-sized exporting firms are eligible for additional credit support throughout this
period and accounting for them is beyond the scope of this paper.
21 The ratio of exporters in the data varies between 25-33% in the data from 2006-2013.
22 This is the highest percentage of subsidized firms since the entire textiles and engineering goods


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS
The studies in the literature evaluating export support programs use quasi-experimental
methods to compare the export performance of treated firms with that of a control
group of firms. In the context of this paper, the firms that become eligible for the
export credit subsidies each year are considered as treated and are identified by the
indicator variable 1(Subsidizedijt). To assess causality between the subsidy scheme
and firms’ export outcomes, the non-random nature of policy assignment must be ac-
counted for. The policy maker’s choice of the set of subsidized industries depends on
which industries they perceive as employment oriented or labor-intensive, and those
facing stiff competition from highly subsidized export sectors in other countries. While
such policy assignment is non-random, it is also not based on firm-specific character-
istics such as productivity, profitability and the financial health of exporting firms.
Additionally, industry support boards perhaps have some lobbying power in the pro-
cess, but specific firms are unlikely to have determined policy assignment at the sector
or product level. To address these concerns, I use a difference-in-differences estimator,
while conditioning on a set of firm and industry covariates. Since I observe a panel
of both treated and control firms, before and after the policy announcement period,
I can control for firm-specific time-invariant unobserved factors as well.23
4.1 BASELINE ESTIMATION
In the baseline estimation, I examine the effect of the export subsidy program on
exports using a generalized version of difference-in-differences. Since the subsidy
program varies in terms of eligible product lines,24 the year-wise effect of the subsidy
can be estimated using the following specification:
23 Most papers in this literature control for selection either by using through matching techniques,
fixed effects, or two-step selection estimation methods.
24 Eligible product lines are mapped to firms using the National Industrial Classification 2008
(NIC-2008) at the four-digit level.
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ijtδ + γjt + ηi + λt + εijt
(2.1)
The subsidized group indicator 1(Subsidizedijt) corresponds to the group of firms
that are subsidized in year t. The year 2006 is assumed as the reference year and
is omitted from the regression to avoid the dummy variable trap.25 The subsidy
indicator variable is interacted with its corresponding year since the eligible set of
product-lines (and hence firms) vary every year. Firms in certain industries manufac-
turing handlooms, carpets and handicrafts enjoyed continued eligibility, and others
lose access to subsidized export credit after one year, but may re-enter. The firm-level
observables Xijt include one-period lagged measures of firm size, return on assets ratio
or EBITDA ratio and firm productivity.
In additional variations, I also include the short-term liquidity ratio and leverage
ratio.26 I account for industry-year specific effects γjt, determined by both demand-
side factors in export markets as well as domestic industry-level factors impacting
firm costs. These also account for other industry-level export incentives announced
by the Indian government in the wake of the global recession in 2008-2009.27 To
account for time-invariant firm-level unobservables, I include firm fixed effects ηi.
To control for macroeconomic or aggregate shocks in the economy,28 I include year
fixed-effects λt. The term εijt is an i.i.d. error term. Thus, the specification assumes
E(εijt| Xijt,1(Subsidizedijt), γjt, ηi, λt) = 0.
Firm-level controls include one-period lagged values of log of firm’s total assets,
25 The year 2006 is the financial year 2006-2007 which spans April 1, 2006 until March 31, 2007.
26 Detailed description of firm-level variables is provided in the Appendix 2.A.
27 In later specifications, I control for year-wise variation in export demand for directly by con-
structing a firm-specific export demand shock which varies at the HS two-digit code and year
level, which corresponds to the four-digit NIC level industry codes.
28 The Reserve Bank of India undertook an expansionary monetary policy during the year of the
crisis, providing more liquidity to the credit markets by lowering the repo rate from 9% to
4.75%, and the reverse repo rate from 6% to 3.25%. The CRR was lowered from 7.5% to 5%,
and the SLR was relaxed as well.
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the return on assets ratio or the EBITDA scaled by total assets, and firm-level produc-
tivity calculated using the method outlined in Asker et al. (2014). This method is an
extension of Olley and Pakes (1996) with imperfect competition in output markets.
Van Beveren (2012) explains how this estimation method overcomes issues related
to simultaneity, selection (unbalanced panel, survival probability) and omitted out-
put price bias. The main measure of short-term liquidity is the current ratio, and
an alternate measure, the quick ratio is used as a robustness check later in the pa-
per. The leverage ratio corresponds to the debt to equity ratio reported at year end.
All firm-level controls are lagged one period to avoid simultaneity bias to the extent
possible.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004) in their treatment of clustering at the level of
treatment for difference-in-differences type estimation, and cluster standard errors at
the level of the treatment status, i.e. at the firm-level. The coefficients of interest βt
capture the relative effect in terms of growth of exports, due to the change in subsidy
status of firms in year t relative to a control group of firms that are not subsidized.
The specification given by Equation 2.1 allows for year-wise estimates for the impact
of subsidies: β2007, β2008, β2009, β2010, β2011, β2012 and β2013.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2, I report the year-wise coefficients correspond-
ing to the subsidized firms. After including firm-level controls, I find that the differ-
ential effect on export growth of subsidized firms is about 4-5%. The only exception
is the year 2009 where the coefficient is 0.029 and is statistically insignificant at the
5% significance level. There is not enough evidence to support that these coefficients
are not equal, as implied by the F-test. As a result, I alter the specifications in the
rest of this paper to include a common subsidized status indicator term across years,
while also reporting important year-wise coefficients in Appendix 2.C. I also estimate
Equation 2.1 with the log of non-exported goods, i.e., domestic market sale of goods,
as the dependent variable. I do not find any evidence of a differential impact on the
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subsidized firms’ domestic sales due to the export credit policy eligibility.
Table 2.2: Impact of the Export Subsidy on Firm Exports from 2007-2013
log(exports)ijt (1) (2)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2007 0.065*** 0.053**
(0.023) (0.025)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2008 0.030* 0.038**
(0.017) (0.018)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2009 0.028* 0.029*
(0.016) (0.017)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2010 0.042*** 0.041**
(0.015) (0.019)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2011 0.051*** 0.047**
(0.015) (0.021)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2012 0.055*** 0.051**
(0.017) (0.022)








F-stat (Difference between coefficients) 0.22 0.42
Prob > F 0.971 0.866
Number of Observations 7,339 6,134
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. This
table reports the baseline estimates of the impact of the export subsidy program from 2007 to 2013
on the exports of firms, corresponding to Equation 2.1. The dependent variable is the deflated log of
exports. The base year is the financial year 2006-2007, the year before the program was introduced.
Firm-level controls for size, profitability and productivity are one-period lagged log of total assets,
EBITDA scaled by total assets, and log of TFPR, respectively. Productivity is calculated following
Asker et al. (2014). Firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are included.
All firm-level variables are deflated using industry-specific deflators.
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4.2 DEMAND SHOCKS
“We are highly dependent on external demand from the US and Europe. Until demand picks
up in these regions, exports won’t rev up.” - Prabir Sengupta, former Commerce Secretary29
To control for the change in global demand conditions for exporting firms, I con-
struct a firm-specific demand index which accounts for product-specific exposure to
demand from various foreign destinations or importer countries, using the real GDP
growth across these countries as a proxy for change in demand.30 Firm-level data by
export destination countries are unavailable.31 So, I map firms by their NIC industry
codes to two-digit HS commodity (or product) codes. I use product-level data on ex-
ports by destination country detailed at the two-digit HS code provided by Comtrade
for India. I use these data to approximate the firms’ exposure to foreign importer
countries, i.e., the share of exports from India in a sector going to a certain country.
I map these demand exposure levels to the importer countries’ real GDP growth rate
using World Bank’s DataBank. Summing the product of demand exposure weight







The main concern with this time-varying demand shock index is the potential
endogeneity. A contemporaneous drop in exports volume of a firm in a certain product
category due to rising transportation or other costs in that industry could cause the
29 As quoted in an article titled Nowhere To Go (February 22, 2009) in the Business Today.
30 I employ the data on exports at the two-digit HS code due to data availability reasons, and also
to keep the demand-side controls at a broader industry level than the product level, which may
be sensitive to changes in importer country demand trends. These data can can be downloaded
from the the World Bank and the UN Comtrade websites, in the DataBank and International
Trade Statistics Database, respectively.
31 As a result, the impact of the policy can not be disentangled in terms of intensive or extensive
margin of exports by export destinations.
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drop in export flows, rather than an actual drop in demand for that product in the
importer country. To address this concern, I restrict the importer-country demand







Table 2.3 reports the annual averages of the demand indices constructed using
the method outlined above. As expected, the magnitude in the years 2008 and 2009
reflect the impact of the recession. This also in sync with the overall decline in the
growth of the world economy as depicted earlier in Figure 2.1.
Table 2.3: Demand Indices of Exporters in the Manufacturing Sector in India









Note: The reported demand indices are constructed as detailed in the methodology in Equation 2.3.
Source: Authors calculations using Prowess, Comtrade and World Bank’s DataBank.
Further, to verify if the year 2009 is indeed the outlier with negative demand-
side shocks, I plot the year-wise distributions of the demand index. As can be seen
from the distributions, the majority of the negative shocks are in 2009 and some in
2008. In all the regressions here on, I include the demand index as a control and drop
the industry-year effects.32 As before, the year fixed-effect λt control for shock(s) to
aggregate demand and credit conditions in India as well as the importing countries
over time, including bilateral exchange rate fluctuations.
32 The industry-year fixed effects will otherwise partially absorb the demand-side effects.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Average Demand Indices for Exporting Firms from
2006-2013.
Source: Author’s calculations using Prowess, Comtrade and World Bank’s DataBank.
log(exports)ijt = β0 + β1×1(Subsidizedijt)×Demand Indexjt + β2×1(Subsidizedijt)
+ β3×Demand Indexjt + X
′
ijtδ + ηi + λt + εijt
(2.4)
I re-estimate the impact of the subsidies controlling for the demand indices. The
results are reported in Table 2.4. The growth of exports of the subsidized firms is
approximately 5.1% higher than the control firms, and the effect is increasing in the
demand index.33 In other words, the subsidy seems to be more effective in years
33 It should be noted that the coefficient of 0.051 translates to e0.051 − 1 = 0.0523, i.e., about
5.23%. I will refrain from making these calculations each time as long as the coefficients are
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with stronger demand from importer countries, as reflected in the coefficient on the
interaction of the subsidized firms and the demand index. Demand-side factors play
a role in determining the effectiveness of the subsidies.














Number of Observations 6,134
Firm Controls Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the baseline estimates of the impact of the export subsidy program from 2007 to
2013 on the exports of firms, corresponding to Equation 2.4. The dependent variable is the deflated
log of exports. The base year is the financial year 2006-2007, before the program was introduced.
Firm-level controls for size, profitability and productivity are one-period lagged log of total assets,
EBITDA scaled by total assets, and log of TFPR, respectively. Productivity is calculated following
Asker et al. (2014). Firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are included.
All firm-level variables are deflated using industry-specific deflators.
small. At coefficient value of 0.1 or 10%, this difference is e0.1 − 1 = 0.1051, i.e., 10.51%.
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I also estimate the average marginal effect of the subsidy, which is depicted in
Figure 2.3. It is interesting to note that as the demand index approaches 0 and then
to negative weighted growth, the average marginal effect is no longer statistically
significant. This implies that there is evidence of a positive impact of the subsidies
only until a certain threshold of demand-side conditions. The coefficients on firm-
level variables corresponding to size, profitability and productivity, are all positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.
I also report the year-wise coefficients using the same specification as Equation
2.2 with year-wise interactions for the subsidized indicator variable in Table 2.11
in Appendix 2.C. The year-wise coefficients are statistically significant in all years
barring the year 2009, i.e., the only year with a negative demand index in the data.
Figure 2.3: Average Marginal Effects of Export Subsidy (95% Confidence Intervals).
Source: From author’s calculations using the regression estimates reported in Table 2.4.
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4.3 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
The studies that are the most relevant for drawing implications for export outcomes
employing firm-level analyses are Manova (2012) and Chaney (2016). These studies
embed credit constraints into the heterogenous firm-level model of Melitz (2003) and
find that firm productivity is very closely positively associated with exporting deci-
sions as the more productive (or profitable) firms tend be less credit constrained. For
firms that cross the initial barrier of becoming an exporter, the role of their firm-level
financial characteristics has a more ambiguous implication at the intensive margin of
export volumes, a priori, i.e., if exporting volumes are increasing in the proxies for
credit constraints, namely, productivity, size and profitability. Muûls (2008) incorpo-
rates both external and internal constraints in a Melitz type set-up and finds results
similar to that of Manova (2012), where both the extensive and the intensive margins
of trade are affected by credit constraints.
To the extent that the financial risks associated with exporting activity are per-
sistent and intense, and that credit constraints do not disappear even for exporting
firms, any policy change that relaxes the credit constraints of exporters will improve
the performance of the relatively credit constrained firms more than their relatively
less constrained counterparts. The two other important variables measuring firms’
financial conditions (and hence the credit constraints) commonly used as proxies are
short-term liquidity and external finance dependence, as measured by the liquidity
ratio and firm leverage (Egger and Kesina (2014)). In this section, I investigate how
export growth of firms in my sample is related to these financial variables, and if there
is an incremental effect on subsidized firms. Following the empirical literature, I also
include interactions with an indicator of access to foreign borrowings and firm-age
as one of the variations of the regression.34 The access to foreign sources of funds
34 I include triple interactions whenever feasible but none of the coefficients on the triple interaction
terms are statistically significant. Hence, I omit presenting those coefficients in the results.
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capture the (partial) dependence on foreign external finance. In normal times, such
funding should cushion a liquidity crunch in the domestic capital markets but after
the global financial crisis there was a significant and persistent drop in foreign sources
of finance for economies around the world (Chor and Manova (2012)). While the ex-
posure of Indian banks to foreign capital markets was limited, firms dependent on
foreign sources of funds could have been negatively affected.35
The main findings are reported in Table 2.5. From column (1) through (3), we can
see that the subsidy has a positive and statistically significant impact on firm exports
and this effect is increasing in the demand index. The effect of the subsidy varies
from 4.1% to 5.2% across the three models, where I account for different measures
of financial constraints. The interaction terms with firm size and firm productivity
reveal that firms that are larger and more productive benefit less from the subsidy
compared to their counterparts. These results agree with implications from the credit
constraints theory, that the relatively smaller and less productive firms benefit more
from a credit subsidy policy that relaxes credit constraints. These two measures (firm
size and productivity) are also positively correlated for firms in my sample, as reported
in Figure 2.6 in Appendix 2.C.36 These results also hold when I include interactions
year by year.37 The positive and highly statistically significant coefficient on the firm
profitability interaction term indicates that the ability of firms to generate profits
remains a clear indicator of performance.
35 I use foreign currency borrowings as a proxy for foreign sources of finance. This includes the
sum of all secured foreign currency borrowings as reported in Prowess such as loans taken
from foreign banks, loans takes from Indian branches of foreign banks, loans taken from foreign
financial institutions, and loans taken from International Development Institutions.
36 The firms in my sample exclude small and micro firms and the productivity calculations are also
based on the subset of firms which do not qualify as micro or small per the official definition of
firm size in India.
37 Results from the regression including year by year interactions are presented in Table 2.12 of
Appendix 2.C.
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Next, I introduce alternate financial constraints indicators, the leverage and liquidity
ratio. According to the estimated coefficients, higher debt dependence is negatively
related to export growth and subsidized firms with relatively higher debt dependence
benefit relatively more. However, the magnitude of these coefficients is too small
to consider them to be economically meaningful. Short-term liquidity is positively
related to the growth of firm exports, but there is not enough evidence to support
that subsidized firms with higher short-term liquidity are affected differently.
Finally, I do not find any effect of access to foreign sources of finance or firm
age. The results pertaining to access to foreign sources of funds complement those of
Chakraborty (2018) (albeit for a subset of the firms) who finds no evidence of foreign
sources of finance affecting exports of manufacturing firms during the recession years.
4.4 BANK RELATIONSHIPS
Strong bank relationships is important indicator of the strength of credit ties (Petersen
and Rajan (1994)), which ultimately influence credit availability for firms. Even in
the presence of financial constraints, stronger bank relationships are associated with
higher credit access. The commonly used measures of the strength of bank relation-
ships are duration of the relationship with the main bank and the number of banks
associated with a firm. The theoretical basis of a positive impact of a higher bank
count is debated in the literature. Firms may build multiple bank relationships to
protect themselves against hold-up rents inherent among exclusive bank relationships.
So, higher number of bankers are an indicator of the ability of banks to overcome the
bargaining power of its bank. Moreover, having multiple bankers may in itself be a
signal of a healthy firm.38 At the same time, association with multiple banks could
also be correlated with weak firm-bank relationships with the main bank.
38 I control for size, profitability and productivity in the regression, so any effect of the bank
relationship variable is after controlling for firm-specific variables.
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Table 2.5: Impact of the Export Subsidies: Controlling for Financial Constraints
log(exports)ijt (1) (2) (3)
Subsidizedijt 0.045** 0.041** 0.052**
(0.021) (0.016) (0.025)
Subsidizedijt × Demand Indexjt 0.016** 0.024** 0.013**
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm-level Determinants
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) -0.044**
(0.017)
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets) 0.068***
(0.004)







Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Leverage) 0.0012**
(0.0006)
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Liquidity) 0.005*
(0.003)
Subsidizedijt × 1(Access to Foreign Capital) -0.008
(0.024)
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Age) 0.037*
(0.021)
Number Of Observations 6,134 5,896 5,896
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The leverage ratio is the debt-to-equity ratio and the liquidity ratio is the current ratio. Access to
foreign funds includes foreign borrowings including loans from foreign banks, from foreign branches
of Indian banks, from foreign institutions and from international development organizations. All
other variables are the same as in Table 2.4.
I exploit the variation in the firm-bank matched data both in terms of the char-
acteristics of the firm-bank relationship as well as the ownership type of the banks.
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Since the export credit subsidy under study works through a direct interest rate
subsidy on short-term loans, exporting firms with stronger relationships are expected
to have better access to subsidized loans. Moreover, in the Indian context, where the
public sector banks are often used as a catalyst to push the government’s policies,
exporters with ties with state-owned banks may benefit relatively more. In the sample
of firms in this paper, the median relationship duration, the median banker count and
the median public sector banker count are 7, 3 and 0.75, respectively.39 To test these
hypotheses, I introduce an interaction term of the subsidy indicator and the bank
relationship indicators into the model.
Table 2.6: Impact of the Export Subsidies: Controlling for Bank Relationships
log(exports)ijt (1) (2) (3)
Subsidizedijt 0.049** 0.050** 0.052**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
Subsidizedijt × Demand Indexjt 0.011** 0.011* 0.013*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Subsidizedijt × Long Relationship Durationi 0.056**
(Above the median duration) (0.025)
Subsidizedijt × High Banker(s) Counti 0.067*
(Above the median # bankers) (0.034)
Subsidizedijt × Public Sector Bankers (PSB)i 0.003
(Above the median # PSBs) (0.024)
Number Of Observations 5,293 5,293 5,293
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the export subsidy program by bank relationships,
averaged over the sample period. For firms that report more than one bank per firm-year, the
duration is based on the median duration among the matched firm-bank pairs, that occurred in
adjacent years. For the number of bankers measure, I count the median number of bankers of firms
across the sample period. For the bank ownership measure, I compute the median of the proportion
of state-owned banks. All firm-level variables are the same as in Table 2.4.
39 These averages are calculated taking means across the entire sample period from 2006-2013.
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In column (1) of Table 2.6, in addition to the controls used in the baseline re-
gression, I include the interaction of the long relationship duration dummy and the
subsidy indicator. Similarly, in columns (2) and (3), I include interaction terms to
account for the count of banks and for public sector banks. I find strong evidence
that subsidized firms with relatively longer bank relationships benefit more. In terms
of the magnitude, there is an almost equal impact (5.6%) longer bank relationships
as that of being subsidized. The coefficients on the other relationship indicators are
positive but not statistically significant.40
4.5 FISCAL BENEFITS
In addition to the export credit subsidies, Indian exporters enjoy access to other ex-
port incentives, subsidies and duty drawbacks41 provided by the state and central
government. These are in the form of production subsidies, tax exemptions, duty
drawbacks and government-funded grants. There are a few empirical studies that
have investigated the effectiveness of fiscal benefits in exporting behavior and export
performance (Bernard and Jensen (2004), Görg et al. (2008)). Whether existing fis-
cal benefits complement the export credit subsidy is an interesting question. For my
sample of firms, I observe fiscal benefits enjoyed by exporters to the extent that they
are captured as cash-benefits. This variable captures duty drawbacks, excise rebates,
production subsidies, duty concessions and tax exemptions.42 Many studies have also
examined the performance of state-owned exporting enterprises with reference to gov-
ernment grants and subsidies (Girma et al. (2009)). To account for firm ownership, I
40 I can not include the bank relationship indicator variables in columns (1) through (3) by them-
selves since they are time-invariant and will be completely absorbed by the firm fixed effects.
I repeat this regression with each of the interactions constructed year by year. The results are
close to the results in Table 2.6, which estimates a common subsidy effect.
41 A duty drawback can take the form of refunds, reductions and waivers, in full or in part, of
customs duties collected upon importing materials or goods which are subsequently exported.
42 I use the one-period lagged variable to reduce the risk of simultaneity bias.
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include an interaction of ownership type of firm.43 Zia (2008) puts forth a connected-
ness theory with reference to large export firms’ relationship with their banks. These
connections could be a cause of entrenched support from banks and the government.
In Section 4.4, I do not find evidence that firms with ties with primarily public sector
banks have any differential benefit. However, the effect could exist for firms that are
owned by the state. So, I include indicators of state-ownership and fiscal benefits as
explanatory variables in the regression model. The results are reported in Table 2.7.
In Figure 2.4, I plot the year by year effect of access to other fiscal benefits for the
subsidized firms and find that the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level of
significance for all but the years 2008 and 2009.
Figure 2.4: Coefficients of >Median Incentives Beneficiary (95% Confidence Intervals).
Source: From author’s calculations using the regression estimates reported in Table 2.13.
43 Private domestic firm ownership is the reference category with which state-owned and foreign-
owned firms’ performance is compared.
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From the results in Table 2.7, I find that firms’ export growth is increasing in the
fiscal benefits (primarily in the form of export incentives) enjoyed by firms. Subsidized
firms with an above average level of export incentives benefit more by about 6% in
export growth terms. This means that existing exporter beneficiaries benefit relatively
more than those that enjoy below average benefits. The above the average cut-off in
the data is almost the same as breaking down exporting firms based on whether or not
they enjoy fiscal benefits. Thus, the two export support policies seem complementary
in terms of their impact on export growth. In column (2), after controlling for firm-
level determinants size, productivity and profitability, I find that the state-owned
subsidized firms exhibit higher export growth compared to privately held domestic
firms. The coefficient on the interaction with foreign-owned status is not statistically
significant.
4.6 EXPORT PARTICIPATION DECISION
In this section, I examine whether the presence of short-term export subsidies matters
for the decision to export for manufacturing firms in India. I verify the same using a
latent variable model accounting for firm-level effects and year effects.
Y ∗ijt = Z
′
ijtβ + ηi + εijt (2.5)
Yijt = 1[Y ∗ijt > 0] (2.6)
Prob (Yijt = 1 |Zijt, ηi) = Prob (Y ∗ijt > 0 |Zijt, ηi) = G(Zijtβ + ηi) (2.7)
where Y ∗ijt is the latent variable and Yijt is an indicator variable for the exporting
status. The model can account for unobserved heterogeniety ηi, which constitutes
the time-invariant firm-specific effects. Zijt comprises firm-level controls, the subsidy
eligibility indicator 1(Subsidizedijt) and year effects. G(.) is the logistic cumulative
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Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) 0.061**
(0.028)
Firm Ownership
Subsidizedijt × State-ownedi 0.057**
(0.026)
Subsidizedijt × Foreign-ownedi -0.021
(0.074)
Number Of Observations 6,134 6,134
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The explanatory variable included is the log of fiscal benefits as described in Section 4.5. All other
variables are the same as in Table 2.4.
distribution function. To examine the impact of the subsidies on the extensive margin,
I first estimate a random effects logit model which assumes that the fixed effects are
uncorrelated with the observed variables. Next, I relax the assumption on the corre-
lation between the fixed effects and the observed variables and estimate a conditional
logit model which is equivalent to a fixed effects type logit. To test whether the fixed
effects estimator or the random effects estimator is more suitable, I run the Hausman
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test. I also estimate the model using alternative financial variables to proxy for fi-
nancial constraints. Since the subsidy announcements of the program being studied
are made at the beginning of a financial year and are applicable only to that current
year, I do not expect the scheme’s impact to be persistent and hence do not expect
to find a statistically significant effect on the exporting decision of firms.44
The result of the logit model and its variants are presented in Table 2.8. In column
(1), I estimate a random effects model controlling for firm-level variables, namely firm
size, firm productivity and firm profitability. Based on the theoretical and empirical
literature, these firm-level covariates are the key determinants of exporting behavior.45
The coefficients on size, productivity and profitability are statistically significant at
the 1% level. These results support the widely accepted hypothesis that firms more
prone to credit constraints are less likely to export. Hence, the export decision is
positively associated with determinants of lower credit constraints. The coefficient
on the subsidy indicator is positive but statistically insignificant. As expected, this
subsidy scheme does not have an effect at the extensive margin of exports, i.e. on
the exporting decision of firms. The results are similar for the fixed effects. The LR
test reveals that the panel estimator is statistically different from the pooled logit
estimator, implying that it is inappropriate to ignore panel variance. The low p-value
associated with the Hausman test implies that the fixed effects estimator is more
suitable vis-a-vis the random effects estimator.46 In columns (3) and (4), I estimate
the conditional logit model with an alternate set of firm-level variables that are proxies
for financial constraints, and fiscal incentives measured at the firm level. While these
factors are important for existing exporters, they are not significant in the model for
44 Since there is evidence of lobbying efforts made by specific industry boards during the years
2008 and 2009, it can not be claimed that the announcements are entirely unanticipated. This
makes is likely that in certain years firms were aware of the subsidy approvals a quarter in
advance. Subsidy eligibility announcements were not made for more than one financial year.
45 Firm age is a key determinant, but being time-invariant, is dropped from the regressions.
46 We reject the null hypothesis that the unobserved individual level effects are uncorrelated with
the other covariates included in the regression.
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the export participation decision. The coefficient on the fiscal incentives measure is
positive and statistically significant but is close to zero in magnitude.
Table 2.8: Impact of the Export Subsidies: Export Participation Decision
Exporting Status (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsidizedijt 0.261 0.667 0.552 0.466
(0.214) (0.517) (0.625) (0.319)
log(assets)ijt−1 0.814*** 0.827*** 1.826*** 0.921***
(0.110) (0.211) (0.046) (0.125)
log(TFPR)ijt−1 1.063*** 0.460*** 0.448***
(0.126) (0.148) (0.151)








Firm-level Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
LR Test (χ̄2) 9372.150
Prob≥ χ̄2 0.000
Hausman Test (χ2) 8.120
Prob≥χ2 0.002
Number Of Observations 5,119 5,091 5,091 5,091
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported are reported in parenthesis.
This table reports the coefficients from estimating logit models, where the dependent variable is an
indicator variable of whether or not the firm exports in a a given year. Columns (1) and (2) report
results from random effects and fixed effects logit estimation, respectively. Column (3) replaces the
firm profitability ratio and productivity with the leverage and short-term liquidity ratio. Column
(4) adds the fiscal incentives measure to the specification in column (2). All firm-level variables are
the same as in Table 2.4. The results of the logit models re-estimated with jackknifed errors are
similar and have not been reported here (available on request).
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5 ROBUSTNESS
I perform various checks to test the sensitivity of the estimates obtained in Section 4
on a year by year basis. These are checks to ensure that the estimate I obtain for the
impact of the subsidy is not statistically different across the time-period. In addition,
I check for few other reasons for concern.47
Demand-side Controls. I introduce the demand index to account for demand-
side shocks in the estimations. I also replace this measure with industry-year trends as
a robustness check. The magnitude of those coefficients is slightly higher as compared
to the estimates in Table 2.4.
Attrition Bias. This is not a concern in the export markets as firms exiting
the sample without reappearing are few. Since Prowess does not track the entry
and exit of firms, I study the financial variables (profits, assets and sales) to check if
firms skipping a few years in the sample are systematically related. I do not find any
pattern in the data that might suggest the presence of such a bias. Less than 4% of
the firms in my sample exit permanently during the sample period.
Short-term Liquidity Measure. The current ratio is the most commonly
used liquidity measure in the literature. However, in the event that short-term obli-
gations need to be paid off immediately, the current ratio could overestimate a firm’s
short-term financial strength since it includes the less liquid inventory stock. This
stock can not always be easily and quickly turned into cash at short notice. Hence, I
replace the current ratio with the quick ratio, which excludes inventory stock, as an
alternative measure to evaluate short term liquidity position of manufacturing firms.
Re-estimating the model using the quick ratio leads to similar results.
Excluding the Energy Sector. A common check in similar trade-related
studies is to drop the energy sector, comprising coke, refined petroleum and nuclear
47 I report results from select checks in Appendix 2.C.
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fuel. Since the sample period includes years of high volatility in global energy prices
which might be the sole driver of the drop in related exports. This is an important
check to the extent that this industry level shock is not captured by industry-year
fixed effects. This corresponds to dropping NIC two-digit code 6: Crude petroleum
and natural gas, and code 19: Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products,
for which there are only 8 and 58 observations, respectively. The results are reported
in Table 2.14. The coefficient on the subsidized indicator is larger and still statistically
significant. Thus, dropping the energy sector does not alter my baseline findings.
Final Caveats. While the results in this paper suggest that there is a posi-
tive impact of an export credit subsidy on medium and large manufacturing firms, the
more consequential impact of the subsidies, perhaps, could be found (or not) for small
and micro firms, especially with respect to employment growth. However, studying
the effect on employment or the effect on small firms is beyond the scope of this paper
due to data limitations. Future research should try to find appropriate methods and
data to analyze the impact of credit subsidy programs on employment generation,
while extending the analysis to small firms. In addition to extensive data, this will
require disentangling credit supply-side factors due to eligibility to the directed lend-
ing program. It should be noted that this empirical study is not a comprehensive
cost-benefit assessment of whether the total sum of tax-payer funds invested in credit
subsidies produced an economically significant impact on export transaction volumes
in the aggregate. The analysis uses data only for medium and large manufacturing
firms. Absent any information on destination and prices of exports, important aspects
of exporting activity such as expansion to more markets and changes in quality and
variety, can not be possibly studied. More extensive data on exporting firms must be
collected if the government aims to undertake a thorough assessment of the impact
of export credit support.
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper evaluates the impact of an export-credit subsidy program at the intensive
margin of exports as well as for the export participation decision of manufacturing
sector firms in India. I exploit the year-wise variation in eligibility to the subsidy to
estimate the effect of the policy on subsidized firms, while controlling for demand-side
shocks as well as firm- and sector-level differences.
I find that the range of estimates of the impact of subsidies varies between 5-8%
in difference-in-differences terms compared to non-subsidized exporters. There is no
evidence suggesting that the subsidies are effective in the event of a substantial drop in
world demand as that experienced during the year after the global financial recession,
thus, suggesting the limited usefulness of credit support as a policy tool during a major
downturn. Moreover, the impact of credit subsidies is higher for firms already enjoying
fiscal benefits, implying a complementary effect of pre-existing benefits. Larger and
more productive firms benefit to a lesser extent than their counterparts, although the
positive impact of the subsidy is higher for the more profitable firms. Firms’ financial
health indicators such as liquidity and leverage do not have any differential effect
on the subsidized firms. Finally, I find that the strength of bank relationships is an
important indicator, when measured by the duration of the firm-bank relationship,
and subsidized firms with longer relationships benefit relatively more. I do not find
any impact on export participation of firms. This is not unexpected given the short-
term and unanticipated nature of the subsidy scheme.
These results have policy implications not only in India, but in other developing
economies that implement similar policies. A broader question in this context is
whether export promotion policies are a useful tool for counter cyclical economic
policy during and after major recessions, or if, instead, resources should be invested






Balance sheet variables of firms are available from the Prowess database. Data on
country-specific GDP and exports are sourced from from World Bank’s DataBank.
Product- and country-wise exports series are downloaded from UN Comtrade.
1. Gross sales: include income earned from sales of goods in the domestic and
the overseas market, as well as indirect taxes such as excise duty, sales tax,
VAT, rates and taxes, turnover tax, service tax, etc.
2. Net sales: are gross sales net of indirect taxes.
3. Total assets: sum of all current and non-current assets held.
4. Total liabilities: includes all sums owed to shareholders (share capital and
reserves & surpluses), lenders (secured and unsecured loans, and all current
liabilities and provisions), and deferred tax liability.
5. Current liabilities: are the liabilities or debts owed to suppliers, vendors,
banks and others, which must be paid within one year.
6. Total borrowings: are the total sum of domestic and foreign borrowings.
7. Foreign bank loans: comprise loans taken from foreign banks, loans takes
from Indian branches of foreign banks, loans taken from foreign financial insti-
tutions, and loans taken from International Development Institutions.
8. Short-term bank loans: are the outstanding value of secured and unsecured
bank borrowings for a period of less than 12 months.
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9. Long-term bank loans: are the outstanding value of secured and unsecured
bank borrowings for beyond 12 months.
10. Raw materials: comprise raw materials, stores & spares as well as purchase
of finished goods used in production.
11. Wages and salaries: are periodic payments made to the employees, including
workers and managers, for the services rendered.
12. EBITDA ratio: the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization, scaled by lagged deflated assets, also, called return on assets.
13. Current ratio: is a liquidity ratio of current assets divided by current liabili-
ties, and determines a firm’s ability to meet its short term obligations, i.e., to
pay off its short-term liabilities.
14. Quick ratio: is a more stringent liquidity ratio of quick assets divided by
current liabilities. Quick assets differ from current assets mainly in that they
do not include inventory.
15. Leverage ratio: is the debt-to-equity ratio which measures the relative pro-
portion of shareholders’ equity and debt used to finance a company’s assets, or
in other words, the proportion of borrowed funds to own funds. It is calculated
by dividing the firm’s total debt by shareholder’s equity (net worth) comprising
equity capital and reserves.
16. Fiscal Benefits: are the direct and measurable cash benefits, subsidies, con-
cessions, and exemptions given by the central, state or local governments. They
include export incentives including duty draw back, sales tax and VAT benefits,
other fiscal benefits and production subsidies.
17. Export of goods: is the value of the goods exported by a firm reported on
Free on Board basis, i.e., when an exporter delivers goods free on board, he pays
all charges involved in getting them actually aboard the ship.
18. Total forex earnings: are the firm’s foreign exchange earnings and outgo
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during a financial year and may come from one of the following: export of
goods and services, earnings from dividend and interest, and deemed exports.
19. GDP growth: the annual growth rate of GDP at market prices based on
constant local currency, where aggregates are based on constant 2010 USD.
20. Export growth: the annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based
on constant local currency, where aggregates are based on constant 2010 USD.
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2.B INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS














13. Solvent extracted de-oiled
cake
14. Plastics and linoleum
15. Gems and jewelry







7. Gems and jewelry
Third Scheme 2010
1. Handlooms
2. Textiles (8 tariff lines)
3. Jute (1 tariff line)
4. Carpets
5. Leather (1 tariff line)
6. Handicrafts
7. Engineering goods (54 lines)
Fourth Scheme 2011
1. Handlooms 2. Carpets 3. Handicrafts





5. Engineering goods50 (134
lines)




Fifth Scheme - Part(ii) 201351
1. Handlooms






8. Engineering goods (134+101 tariff lines)




13. Solvent extracted de-oiled cake
14. Plastics and linoleum
15. Gems and jewelry
Subsidy Scheme Withdrawn 2014
48 All Jute categories amount to the same categories of both raw and yarn including floor coverings.
49 Category includes processed cashew, coffee and tea products.
50 134 tariff lines added for the period January 2013 to March 2014.
51 The interest rate on the subsidy was raised from 2% to 3% in this last scheme.
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INDUSTRY AND COMMODITY CLASSIFICATIONS
Table 2.9: NIC 2008 Two-Digit Industry Classification
S.No. Industry Title
1 Crop and animal production, hunting and related
2 Forestry and logging
3 Fishing and aquaculture
5 Mining of coal and lignite
6 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
7 Mining of metal ores
8 Other mining and quarrying
9 Mining support service activities
10* Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12* Manufacture of tobacco products
13* Manufacture of textiles
14* Manufacture of wearing apparel
15* Manufacture of leather and related products
16* Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork
17* Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Manufacture of printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
22* Manufacture of rubber and plastics products
23* Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24* Manufacture of basic metals
25* Manufacture of fabricated metal products
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
Notes: Firms in the Prowess database are mapped to detailed NIC (National Industrial Classifica-
tion) industries. This list can be found at the website of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation, Government of India. The industries that are starred (*) have been identified as
labor-intensive industries by in a report of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic
Relations prepared by Das et al. (2009). This list omits non-manufacturing industries.
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Table 2.10: Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
HS Code Commodity Description
1 Live animals
2 Meat and edible meat offal
3 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates
4 Dairy produce, birds eggs, natural honey
5 Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified
6 Live trees and other plants
7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers
8 Edible fruit and nuts, peel of citrus fruit or melons
9 Coffee, tea, spices
10 Cereals
11 Products of the milling industry, malt, starches, inulin
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits
13 Lac, gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts
14 Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products nes
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils
16 Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations
19 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk, bakers’ wares
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit or nuts
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
23 Residues and waste from the food industries
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes
25 Salt, sulfur, earths and stone, plastering materials
26 Ores, slag and ash





32 Tanning or dyeing extracts
33 Essential oils and resinoids, perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations
34 Soap, organic surface-active agents
35 Albuminoidal substances, modified starches, glues, enzymes
36 Explosives, pyrotechnic products, matches
37 Photographic or cinematographic goods
38 Miscellaneous chemical products
39 Plastics and articles thereof
40 Rubber and articles thereof
41 Raw hides and skins (other than fur skins) and leather
42 Articles of leather, saddlery and harness
Continued on next page
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Table 2.10 – Continued from previous page
HS Code Commodity Description
43 Fur skins and artificial fur, manufactures thereof
44 Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal
45 Cork and articles of cork
46 Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials
47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulose material
48 Paper and paperboard, articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard
49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry
50 Silk
51 Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, horsehair yarn and woven fabric
52 Cotton
53 Other vegetable textile fibers, paper yarn and woven fabric of paper yarn
54 Man-made filaments
55 Man-made staple fibers
56 Wadding, felt and non-wovens, special yarns, twine, cordage, ropes
57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings
58 Special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings
59 Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted
62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted
63 Other made up textile articles, sets, worn clothing and worn textile articles
64 Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts of such articles
65 Headgear and parts thereof
66 Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat sticks, whips, riding-crops
67 Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down
68 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials
69 Ceramic products
70 Glass and glassware
71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones
72 Iron and steel
73 Articles of iron or steel
74 Copper and articles thereof
75 Nickel and articles thereof
76 Aluminum and articles thereof
78 Lead and articles thereof
79 Zinc and articles thereof
80 Tin and articles thereof
81 Other base metals, cermets, articles thereof
82 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal
83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal
84 Machinery and mechanical appliances, parts thereof
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof, sound recorders
86 Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof
Continued on next page
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Table 2.10 – Continued from previous page
HS Code Commodity Description
87 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof
89 Ships, boats and floating structures
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision
91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof
92 Musical instruments, parts and accessories of such articles
93 Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories thereof
94 Furniture, bedding, mattresses, cushions and similar stuffed furnishing
95 Toys, games and sports requisites, parts and accessories thereof
96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
97 Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques
99 Commodities not specified according to kind
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2.C FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 2.5: Share in India’s Exports in 2006 by Top Product Categories and by
Country. (Total goods exported from India in 2006: USD 121.2 Billion in current USD.)
Source: From the author’s calculations using the data from Comtrade for Trade in Goods.
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Figure 2.6: Correlation between log(TFPR) and log(total assets) from 2006 to 2013.
Source: Author’s calculations using the sample of firms from the Prowess database.
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Table 2.11: Impact of the Export Subsidies: Year-by-year Demand Shocks
log(exports)ijt Coefficient
Subsidizedijt × Year 2007 0.046***
(0.015)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2008 0.029**
(0.014)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2009 0.034
(0.024)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2010 0.033**
(0.016)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2011 0.044**
(0.021)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2012 0.035**
(0.016)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2013 0.043**
(0.016)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2007 × Demand Indexjt 0.021**
(0.009)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2008 × Demand Indexjt 0.015**
(0.061)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2009 × Demand Indexjt 0.009*
(0.005)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2010 × Demand Indexjt 0.011**
(0.005)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2011 × Demand Indexjt 0.013**
(0.005)
Subsidizedijt × Year 2012 × Demand Indexjt 0.015**
(0.007)




Number of Observations 6,134
Firm Controls Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
All firm-level variables are same as in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.12: Year-wise Impact by Firm Characteristics
log(exports)ijt Coefficient
Subsidizedijt × Year 2007 0.048**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2008 0.027**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2009 0.029
Subsidizedijt × Year 2010 0.032**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2011 0.047**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2012 0.053**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2013 0.042**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2007 × Demand Indexjt 0.018**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2008 × Demand Indexjt 0.014**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2009 × Demand Indexjt 0.011*
Subsidizedijt × Year 2010 × Demand Indexjt 0.014**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2011 × Demand Indexjt 0.016**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2012 × Demand Indexjt 0.014**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2013 × Demand Indexjt 0.011**
Demand Indexjt 0.031**
By Firm Size
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) × Year 2007 -0.041**
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) × Year 2008 0.019*
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) × Year 2009 0.022
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) × Year 2010 -0.027**
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) × Year 2011 -0.031**
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) × Year 2012 -0.039***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Firm Size) × Year 2013 -0.049***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.12 – Continued from previous page
log(exports)ijt Coefficient
By Return on Assets
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets)× Year 2007 0.076***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets)× Year 2008 0.029
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets)× Year 2009 -0.023
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets)× Year 2010 0.140***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets)× Year 2011 0.064***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets)× Year 2012 0.065***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Return on Assets)× Year 2013 0.088***
By Firm Productivity
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Productivity) × Year 2007 -0.029***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Productivity) × Year 2008 -0.023*
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Productivity) × Year 2009 -0.043*
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Productivity) × Year 2010 -0.035***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Productivity) × Year 2011 -0.016**
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Productivity) × Year 2012 -0.034***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Productivity) × Year 2013 -0.028***
Number of Observations 6,134
Firm Controls Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
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Table 2.13: Year-wise Impact by Fiscal Benefits
log(exports)ijt Coefficient
Subsidizedijt × Year 2007 0.048**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2008 0.027**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2009 0.029
Subsidizedijt × Year 2010 0.052**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2011 0.047**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2012 0.053**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2013 0.042**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2007 × Demand Indexjt 0.018**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2008 × Demand Indexjt 0.014**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2009 × Demand Indexjt 0.011*
Subsidizedijt × Year 2010 × Demand Indexjt 0.014**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2011 × Demand Indexjt 0.010**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2012 × Demand Indexjt 0.014**
Subsidizedijt × Year 2013 × Demand Indexjt 0.011**
Demand Indexjt 0.029**
Fiscal Benefitsijt−1 0.039**
By Fiscal Benefits Received
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) × Year 2007 0.063**
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) × Year 2008 0.018
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) × Year 2009 -0.034
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) × Year 2010 0.040**
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) × Year 2011 0.063***
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) × Year 2012 0.051**
Continued on next page
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Table 2.13 – Continued from previous page
log(exports)ijt Coefficient
Subsidizedijt × 1(>Median Incentives Beneficiary) × Year 2013 0.061**
Number of Observations 6,134
Firm Controls Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.














Number of Observations 5,887
Firm Controls Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This table reports the baseline estimates of the impact of the export subsidy program from 2007 to
2013 on the exports of firms, corresponding to Equation 2.4. All variables are same as in Table 2.4.
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Bricongne, J.-C., Fontagné, L., Gaulier, G., Taglioni, D., and Vicard, V. (2012).
Firms and the global crisis: French exports in the turmoil. Journal of international
Economics, 87(1):134–146.
117
Cadot, O., Fernandes, A. M., Gourdon, J., and Mattoo, A. (2015). Are the ben-
efits of export support durable? evidence from tunisia. Journal of International
Economics, 97(2):310–324.
Cansino, J. M., Lopez-Melendo, J., Pablo-Romero, M. d. P., and Sánchez-Braza, A.
(2013). An economic evaluation of public programs for internationalization: The
case of the diagnostic program in spain. Evaluation and Program Planning, 41:38–
46.
Chakraborty, P. (2018). The great trade collapse and indian firms. The World Econ-
omy, 41(1):100–125.
Chaney, T. (2016). Liquidity constrained exporters. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 72:141–154.
Chor, D. and Manova, K. (2012). Off the cliff and back? credit conditions and interna-
tional trade during the global financial crisis. Journal of International Economics,
87(1):117–133.
Cole, R. A., Goldberg, L. G., and White, L. J. (2004). Cookie cutter vs. character:
The micro structure of small business lending by large and small banks. Journal of
financial and quantitative analysis, 39(2):227–251.
Cole, S. (2009). Fixing market failures or fixing elections? agricultural credit in india.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, pages 219–250.
Das, D. K., Wadhwa, D., and Kalita, G. (2009). The Employment Potential of La-
bor Intensive Industries in India’s Organized Manufacturing. Indian Council for
Research on International Economic Relations.
Defever, F., Reyes, J.-D., Riaño, A., and Varela, G. J. (2017). All these worlds
118
are yours, except india: the effectiveness of export subsidies in nepal (world bank
paper).
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (1998). Law, finance, and firm growth. The
Journal of Finance, 53(6):2107–2137.
Eaton, J., Kortum, S., Neiman, B., and Romalis, J. (2016). Trade and the global
recession. American Economic Review, 106(11):3401–38.
Egger, P. H. and Kesina, M. (2014). Financial constraints and the extensive and
intensive margin of firm exports: panel data evidence from china. Review of De-
velopment Economics, 18(4):625–639.
Feenstra, R. C., Li, Z., and Yu, M. (2014). Exports and credit constraints under
incomplete information: Theory and evidence from china. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 96(4):729–744.
Francesconi, M. and van der Klaauw, W. (2007). The socioeconomic consequences of
”in-work”benefit reform for british lone mothers. The Journal of Human Resources,
42.
Girma, S., Gong, Y., Görg, H., and Yu, Z. (2009). Can production subsidies explain
china’s export performance? evidence from firm-level data. The Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 111(4):863–891.
Goldberg, P. K., Khandelwal, A. K., Pavcnik, N., and Topalova, P. (2010). Multi-
product firms and product turnover in the developing world: Evidence from india.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4):1042–1049.
Görg, H., Henry, M., and Strobl, E. (2008). Grant support and exporting activity.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(1):168–174.
119
Helmers, C., Trofimenko, N., et al. (2010). Export subsidies in a heterogeneous firms
framework: Evidence from colombia. Centre for the Study of African Economies
Working Paper Series, (2010-26).
Hernández-Cánovas, G. and Mart́ınez-Solano, P. (2006). Banking relationships: ef-
fects on debt terms for small spanish firms. Journal of Small Business Management,
44(3):315–333.
Jayaratne, J. and Wolken, J. (1999). How important are small banks to small business
lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms. Journal of Banking & Finance,
23(2):427–458.
Kapoor, M., Ranjan, P., and Raychaudhuri, J. (2012). The impact of credit con-
straints on exporting firms: empirical evidence from india.
Kapoor, M., Ranjan, P., and Raychaudhuri, J. (2017). The impact of credit con-
straints on exporting firms: Evidence from the provision and subsequent removal
of subsidised credit. The World Economy, 40(12):2854–2874.
Kumar, N. (2014). Political interference on firms: Effect of elections on bank lending
in india. Technical report, Working paper, University of Chicago.
Lederman, D., Olarreaga, M., and Payton, L. (2010). Export promotion agencies: Do
they work? Journal of Development Economics, 91(2):257–265.
Lelarge, C., Sraer, D., and Thesmar, D. (2010). Entrepreneurship and credit con-
straints: Evidence from a french loan guarantee program. In International differ-
ences in entrepreneurship, pages 243–273. University of Chicago Press.
Levchenko, A. A., Lewis, L. T., and Tesar, L. L. (2010). The collapse of international
trade during the 2008–09 crisis: in search of the smoking gun. IMF Economic
review, 58(2):214–253.
120
Levinsohn, J. and Petrin, A. (2003). Estimating production functions using inputs to
control for unobservables. The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2):317–341.
Manova, K. (2012). Credit constraints, heterogeneous firms, and international trade.
Review of Economic Studies, 80(2):711–744.
Martincus, C. V. and Carballo, J. (2010). Beyond the average effects: The distribu-
tional impacts of export promotion programs in developing countries. Journal of
Development Economics, 92(2):201–214.
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggre-
gate industry productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725.
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